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ARTICLES
IMPROVING  HUMAN  RIGHTS  COMPLIANCE
IN SUPPLY CHAINS
Kishanthi Parella*
Corporations try to convince us that they are good global citizens: “brands take stands” by
engaging in cause philanthropy; CEOs of prominent corporations tackle a variety of issues; and
social values drive marketing strategies for goods and services.  But despite this rhetoric, corpora-
tions regularly fall short in their conduct.  This is especially true in supply chains where a
number of human rights abuses frequently occur.  One solution is for corporations to engage in
meaningful human rights due diligence that involves monitoring human rights, reporting on
social and environmental performance, undertaking impact assessments, and consulting with
groups whose human rights they can harm.  The challenge is how to encourage corporations to
make these changes.
We often rely on two types of tools to improve corporate compliance: legal institutions and
reputational mechanisms.  However, each of these faces significant limitations when it comes to
human rights compliance in the supply chain.  This Article develops a strategy based on comple-
mentarity between the two so that each compensates for the limitations of the other.  Specifically,
reputational mechanisms can help create incentives for compliance with international legal insti-
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tutions with weak or absent enforcement mechanisms.  Alternatively, legal institutions can create
“focal points” regarding corporate best practices that can improve reputational markets for corpo-
rate social responsibility.
The reputational typology developed in this Article offers three important contributions to
policy and academic discussions concerning corporate misconduct.  First, it allows us to create
better human rights institutions by revealing the types of “carrots and sticks” that we should
include to encourage corporate cooperation; this lesson is particularly timely because an interna-
tional treaty on business and human rights is in development.  Second, this typology illustrates
how corporations may voluntarily undertake organizational change in response to a reputational
crisis.  Finally, this typology identifies drivers of cross-border compliance for transnational
corporations.
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INTRODUCTION
Last year, many of the world’s largest corporations took a reputational
hit, with particularly large declines for U.S. companies.1  These declines
reveal a “crisis of trust in the court of public opinion” as corporations fail to
deliver on our expectations of them.2
This is particularly true for transnational corporations (TNCs) that oper-
ate globally through elaborate supply chains.  Many of our most beloved
brands do not actually make the products for which we love them: iPhones,
sneakers, handbags, etc.3  Instead, these products are sourced, manufac-
tured, assembled, transported, distributed, warehoused, marketed, and sold
by several different companies, often in several parts of the world.4
The supply chain is a source of both strength and weakness for corpora-
tions.  While they offer considerable competitive advantages for many of the
world’s largest companies, they are also sources of reputational vulnerability
for the same.  For example, Nike vaulted to the top of the footwear industry
through smart choices concerning its supply chain that allowed it to save on
production costs and divert those resources to marketing.5  But media expo-
sure revealed that this cost saving also comes at a cost, contributing to “sweat-
shop conditions” in these supply chains.  Exposure of supply chain
conditions contributed to consumer boycotts and shareholder activism—all
with serious and negative reputational effects for Nike.6  The same is true for
Apple.  Often heralded as the leader in supply chain management, Apple has
1 REPUTATION INST., GLOB. REPTRAK 100, POWERING THE WORLD’S MOST REPUTABLE
COMPANIES 9–10, 44 (2018), https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/2963875/_PDF/RepTrak/
2018-GlobalRT100-Presentation.pdf?t=1535145221533%20target=.
2 Id. at 15 (capitalization altered).
3 See generally PIETRA RIVOLI, THE TRAVELS OF A T-SHIRT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: AN
ECONOMIST EXAMINES THE MARKETS, POWER, AND POLITICS OF WORLD TRADE (2d ed. 2009).
4 Samuel J. Palmisano, The Globally Integrated Enterprise, FOREIGN AFF., May–June 2006,
at 127, 129.
5 Miguel Korzeniewicz, Commodity Chains and Marketing Strategies: Nike and the Global
Athletic Footwear Industry, in COMMODITY CHAINS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 247, 252 (Gary
Gereffi & Miguel Korzeniewicz eds., 1994) (explaining that Nike’s sourcing strategy
allowed it to “retain control over highly profitable nodes in the athletic footwear commod-
ity chain, while avoiding the rigidity and pressures that characterize the more competitive
nodes of the chain”); Max Nisen, How Nike Solved Its Sweatshop Problem, BUS. INSIDER (May 9,
2013), https://www.businessinsider.com/how-nike-solved-its-sweatshop-problem-2013-5.
6 Jeffrey Ballinger, The New Free-Trade Heel: Nike’s Profits Jump on the Backs of Asian Work-
ers, HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 1992, at 46.
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been plagued with media exposure and public criticism concerning labor
practices in its supply chain.7
This Article examines the following: What does it mean to be socially respon-
sible in the supply chain?  We can imagine two different answers: “do good” or,
at least, “do no harm.”  Under the first approach, we might hope that trans-
national corporations contribute to the social welfare of those in their supply
chains, such as by building hospitals, developing infrastructure, improving
access to health care, contributing to water purification efforts, and more.8
Instead, this Article investigates the second approach to corporate social
responsibility in the supply chain: the “corporate responsibility to re-
spect” that requires corporations to “become aware of, prevent and address
adverse human rights impacts.”9  It is at this nexus that social responsibility
7 See infra text accompanying notes 71–73.
8 See generally CORPORATE SECURITY RESPONSIBILITY? (Nicole Deitelhoff & Klaus Dieter
Wolf eds., 2010); Jay Butler, Corporations as Semi-States, 57 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221
(2019); Jedrzej George Frynas, The False Developmental Promise of Corporate Social Responsibil-
ity?: Evidence from Multinational Oil Companies, 81 INT’L AFF. 581 (2005).
9 John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises), Protect,
Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶¶ 55–56, U.N. Doc. A/
HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2018); see Companion Note I to the Working Group’s 2018 Report to
the General Assembly (A/73/163): Corporate Human Rights Due Diligence—Background
Note Elaborating on Key Aspects (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Issues/Business/Session18/CompanionNote1DiligenceReport.pdf (“The corporate
responsibility to respect human rights refers to internationally recognized human rights—
understood, at a minimum, as those set out in the International Bill of Human Rights
(consisting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights) and the International Labour Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work.”).  Human rights due diligence is “is a way for enterprises to
proactively manage potential and actual adverse human rights impacts with which they are
involved.”  Summary of the Report of the Working Group on Business and Human Rights
to the General Assembly, October 2018 (A/73/163): Corporate Human Rights Due Dili-
gence: Emerging Practices, Challenges and Ways Forward (Oct. 2018) [hereinafter Corpo-
rate Human Rights Due Diligence], https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/
ExecutiveSummaryA73163.pdf.  It is associated with four core components:
(a) Identifying and assessing actual or potential adverse human rights impacts that the
enterprise may cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which may be
directly linked to its operations, products or services by its business relationships;
(b) Integrating findings from impact assessments across relevant company processes and
taking appropriate action according to its involvement in the impact; (c) Tracking
the effectiveness of measures and processes to address adverse human rights impacts
in order to know if they are working; (d) Communicating on how impacts are being
addressed and showing stakeholders—in particular affected stakeholders—that
there are adequate policies and processes in place.
Id.; see Report of the Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, transmitted by the Secretary-General, Pursu-
ant to Human Rights Council Resolutions 17/4 and 35/7, ¶¶ 10–14, U.N. Doc. A/73/163
(July 16, 2018); see also U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, THE CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERPRETATIVE GUIDE 31 (2012) (“It is
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becomes a matter of corporate compliance—specifically, about human
rights.10
A key component of a successful compliance strategy is incentives.11  For
corporations, incentives can be supplied by either national or international
legal institutions or reputational mechanisms (or some combination of
both).  The problem is that each of these independently is inadequate to
address the incentive problem for social compliance.
Let’s begin with the legal incentives.  Many national and international
transparency laws and other initiatives only require that corporations publicly
disclose what steps they take to improve social compliance in supply chains,
but many do not require that corporations adopt specific compliance pro-
grams.12  A corporation can satisfy these laws by stating what it does or does
not do.  In contrast, article 5(2) of the 2019 revised draft of a legally binding
instrument on business and human rights (“BHR treaty”)  requires that state
through human rights due diligence that an enterprise identifies the information it needs
in order to understand its specific human rights risks at any specific point in time and in
any specific operating context, as well as the actions it needs to take to prevent and miti-
gate them.  ‘Human rights risks’ refers to the risks of having an adverse impact on human
rights, as against risks to the enterprise itself, although the former increasingly leads to the
latter.”).
10 See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949,
958 (2009) (defining compliance as “a system of policies and controls that organizations
adopt to deter violations of law and to assure external authorities that they are taking steps
to deter violations of law”); id. at 960 (“Compliance programs also deter wrongdoing by
generating social norms that champion law-abiding behavior. . . . Social norms fill the gaps
left by more formal enforcement mechanisms.  Norm-based compliance programs also
increase deterrence insofar as they permit organizations to discipline employees for viola-
tions that transgress social norms, but otherwise fall just short of legal violations.” (foot-
notes omitted)); Sean J. Griffith, Corporate Governance in an Era of Compliance, 57 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2075, 2093 (2016) (defining the “common core of compliance [as] con-
sist[ing] of four functional elements: (1) a structural nexus, (2) information flows, (3)
monitoring and surveillance, and (4) risk-rated enforcement”); Veronica Root, The Compli-
ance Process, 94 IND. L.J. 203, 219–20 (2019) (defining the compliance process as involving
“prevention, detection, investigation, and remediation”); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Compliance
Function: An Overview 1 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-
36, 2014), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-faculty/colloquium/law-econom
ics/documents/2017_Spring_Miller_Compliance.pdf (“The compliance function consists
of efforts organizations undertake to ensure that employees and others associated with the
firm do not violate applicable rules, regulations or norms.”); see also ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., OECD DUE DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT
21 (2018).
11 Miller, supra note 10, at 2; see Griffith, supra note 10, at 2084–85 (discussing the
effect of the federal sentencing guidelines and settlement tactics on companies’ willingness
to implement effective compliance programs).
12 See, e.g., KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN
SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE, at i (2015) (“The California Transparency in Sup-
ply Chains Act does not mandate that businesses implement new measures to ensure that
their product supply chains are free from human trafficking and slavery.  Instead, the law
only requires that covered businesses make the required disclosures—even if they do little
or nothing at all to safeguard their supply chains.”).
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parties to the treaty adopt measures that ensure that those conducting busi-
ness activities engage in human rights due diligence.13  The draft text specifi-
cally lists the compliance requirements of human rights due diligence
including identifying and assessing human rights risks, taking preventative
action, monitoring human rights impacts, and communicating with stake-
holders on progress.14  However, while promising, this treaty may fail in
many ways.  Even if a draft text is adopted, the home jurisdictions of large
transnational corporations, such as the United States, may decline to join the
treaty or implement its requirements through domestic legislation.  This
presents a problem because treaties regulate corporations vis-a`-vis state
intermediaries; if states are unwilling to fulfill this role, then it proves chal-
lenging for a treaty to regulate corporations directly.
Alternatively, we can turn to the reputational markets to provide the
incentives that the law cannot.  But reputational markets have their own
incentive problems that have to do with signaling.  Corporations may only
invest in costly compliance efforts if there is a prospect of a reward, such as
increased market gains.  The problem with reputational markets for social
compliance is that the actors who supply the reputational rewards or sanc-
tions—such as consumers—often cannot tell the difference between a good
compliance program and public relations “greenwashing.”  This confusion
creates the risk that “good firms” are undercompensated and “bad firms” are
overcompensated by the reputational markets, thereby reducing the likeli-
hood that the former will actually invest in a meaningful compliance pro-
gram given that the costs invested in a compliance program are
unrecognized and unrewarded in the reputational markets.  This signaling
problem compromises the types of voluntary organizational change that we
may expect both ex ante (preventative) or ex post (reactive).  Corporations
may be unwilling to invest in costly compliance efforts ex ante if their efforts
go unrecognized and unrewarded in the marketplace.  Similarly, even corpo-
rations struggling to reestablish legitimacy following a crisis may opt for a
lower level of organizational change if it is sufficient to satisfy consumers.15
This is where the law comes in.  This Article argues that the incentive
problem is surmounted by blending “law and reputation” so that (a) reputa-
tional mechanisms improve the effectiveness of legal institutions, such as the
BHR treaty, or (b) legal institutions improve reputational markets for social
compliance by correcting the signaling problem.  This Article draws upon
scholarship examining international human rights,16 organizational behav-
13 UN OEIGWG Chairmanship, Revised Draft, Legally Binding Instrument to Regu-
late, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and




15 See infra Part IV.
16 See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 114–26 (2009); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
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ior,17 and corporate reputation18 to develop a typology that illustrates the
complementarity between reputational mechanisms and international legal
institutions that can improve human rights compliance in global supply
chains.
First, reputational mechanisms can help improve the effectiveness of
international legal institutions (reputation enhances law).  This Article’s typol-
ogy may help design better international agreements concerning human
rights by identifying the “carrots and sticks” an agreement should include in
order to incentivize corporations to cooperate.  This insight is particularly
important when we consider that the business and human rights treaty under
development may never enter into force; even if it does, powerful states may
refuse to join it.  This Article’s typology of reputational mechanisms explores
how this treaty can “shortcut the state” to reach its primary audience—corpo-
rations—even if that corporation’s home jurisdiction refuses to join the
treaty.19
Second, legal institutions (both domestic and international) can
improve signaling within reputational markets for social compliance, thereby
correcting the incentive problem (law enhances reputational markets).  Legal
institutions can do so in a number of ways.  First, legal institutions can create
Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 2007 (2002); Oona Hathaway & Scott J. Shapiro, Outcasting:
Enforcement in Domestic and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 302–06 (2011); Thomas
Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic
Practices: Introduction, in THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 29 (Thomas Risse et al. eds.,
1999); Kathryn Sikkink, Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations: The Case of the WHO/
UNICEF Code, 40 INT’L ORG. 815, 815 (1986).
17 See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 554–56
(2000); INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS ORCHESTRATORS (Kenneth W. Abbott et al. eds.,
2015); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0, at 122–25 (2006); JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD
R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS 43 (1978); Richard H McAdams,
A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1652 (2000); see also DOUGLASS C.
NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4–5 (1990);
Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZA-
TIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 70 (Walter W. Powell & Paul J. DiMaggio eds., 1991); Gillian K. Had-
field & Barry R. Weingast, What Is Law? A Coordination Model of the Characteristics of Legal
Order, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 471, 474 (2012); John W. Meyer & Brian Rowan, Institutionalized
Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. SOC. 340, 341 (1977); W.
Richard Scott, The Adolescence of Institutional Theory, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 493, 502–03 (1987).
18 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 121 (1992); Charles J. Fombrun, The Building
Blocks of Corporate Reputation: Definitions, Antecedents, Consequences, in THE OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 94, 103 (Michael L. Barnett & Timothy G. Pollock eds.,
2012); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 1437, 1443–44 (2010); Barak D. Richman, The Antitrust of Reputation Mechanisms:
Institutional Economics and Concerted Refusals to Deal, 95 VA. L. REV. 325, 327 (2009).
19 See Jay Butler, The Corporate Keepers of International Law (June 2019) (unpub-
lished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3405630.
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a “focal point”20 regarding normative standards that helps to correct reputa-
tional markets so that “good firms” are adequately rewarded for their invest-
ments in costly compliance programs.  Legal institutions can help correct this
problem by serving as a “focal point” for what constitutes best practices on
global social compliance.  This focal point then helps to distinguish between
different companies purporting to “invest in CSR” (corporate social responsi-
bility) so that genuine compliance programs “stand out” and are appropri-
ately rewarded.21
Second, this signaling value is especially important in a postcrisis situa-
tion when a corporation embarks on organizational change.  Like all organi-
zations, a corporation is not self-sufficient.22  It requires certain resources to
survive, and those resources are provided by external actors.23  Legitimacy is
such a resource.24  Corporations need it to secure consumers, recruit talent,
appease regulators, and satisfy local communities.25  Corporate legitimacy is
20 Under the focal-point theory of expressive law, legal institutions influence conduct,
even when they lack coercive power, because of their ability to coordinate action.  Specifi-
cally, Richard McAdams argues that laws are forms of “third-party expression” that can
coordinate behavior by establishing focal points through legal rules.  McAdams, supra note
17, at 1668.  Legal rules can create focal points because of certain special features that laws
possess—publicity, uniqueness, and reputation of officials:
The publicity frequently accorded law means it is more likely to create the expec-
tations necessary for coordination.  Further, various features of law create a
[u]niqueness to legal expression that frequently causes its message to “stand out”
against the background of public discourse.  Finally, because the publicity and
uniqueness of law gives government officials the ability to create a focal point and
influence behavior, these officials may develop a reputation for correctly “predict-
ing” future behavior.
Id.
21 See Roy Shapira, A Reputational Theory of Corporate Law, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1,
7–10 (2015) (describing the value of judicial opinions for operation of reputational
sanctions).
22 PFEFFER & SALANCIK, supra note 17, at 2.
23 Id. (“Organizations are linked to environments by federations, associations, cus-
tomer-supplier relationships, competitive relationships, and a social-legal apparatus defin-
ing and controlling the nature and limits of these relationships.  Organizations must
transact with other elements in their environment to acquire needed resources . . . .”).
24 See Craig Deegan, The Legitimising Effect of Social and Environmental Disclosures—A The-
oretical Foundation, 15 ACCT. AUDITING & ACCOUNTABILITY J. 282, 293 (2002) (“Legitimacy is
considered to be a resource on which an organisation is dependent for survival.”); David
Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, The Kasky-Nike Threat to Corporate Social Reporting: Implementing a
Standard of Optimal Truthful Disclosure as a Solution, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 5, 8 (2007); Brayden
G. King & David A. Whetten, Rethinking the Relationship Between Reputation and Legitimacy: A
Social Actor Conceptualization, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 192, 192 (2008) (“Reputation and
legitimacy represent intangible assets that firms rely on to enhance their performance and
chances of survival.”).
25 See, e.g., Ronald Sims, Toward a Better Understanding of Organizational Efforts to Rebuild
Reputation Following an Ethical Scandal, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 453, 455 (2009) (“[T]he value of a
good reputation continues to grow largely because of the competitive advantage and mar-
ket differentiation it delivers—higher sales generated by satisfied customers and their
referrals; relationships with the right strategic and business partners; ability to attract,
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particularly low following a corporate crisis—such as one involving human
rights abuses.  What follows is a process of organizational change linked to
reputational mechanisms: A disgraced corporation—exposed for its poor
labor, environmental, or other internal practices—associates itself with one
or more reputable organizations to address the reputational harm it suffered
as a result of the scandal.  Such associations allow these external organiza-
tions, often NGOs (nongovernmental organizations), to play a role in devel-
oping new rules that address the corporations’ problematic practices, and
corporations adopt these practices to obtain the association with the NGO.
Through this process, legal institutions—insufficient on their own to
improve corporate conduct—nonetheless improve the operation of reputa-
tional sanctions that can, in turn, incentivize corporations to engage in orga-
nizational change.26
Consider the following examples.  Following years of public criticism
and shareholder activism concerning its overseas “sweatshops,” Disney
partnered with the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR),
among others, to launch “Project Kaleidoscope,” a new international labor
standards program for its factories that included a revised code of conduct
and plans for remediation.27  Similarly, Hershey, Nestle´, and Mars partnered
with the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 2011 to develop a new
action plan to combat child labor in cocoa growing communities in Ghana
and Coˆte d’Ivoire following reports of child exploitation in cocoa supply
chains.28  These disparate examples illustrate two important lessons: First,
moments of reputational crisis offer the potential for corporate change.  Sec-
ond, the need for legitimacy changes the power dynamic between the power-
ful and the reputable, allowing the latter to wield a stick it might not
otherwise possess.
Part I explains the value and risks of the global supply chain to transna-
tional corporations.  Part II introduces a typology of reputational mecha-
nisms based on scholarship in international law examining state compliance.
develop and retain the best talent; benefit of the doubt by stakeholders if crisis strikes;
spread of positive word of mouth; potential to raise capital and share price; and in some
cases, the option to charge premium prices.  Also, in an age of regulatory watchdogs, a
positive reputation can improve relationships with government officials and regulators.”).
26 Scholarship examining the complementarity between legal and reputational sanc-
tions focuses on the ways that legal processes, such as lawsuits, can improve reputational
sanctions by (a) providing a public signal of wrongdoing that gets public attention and
provokes a reaction, and (b) supplying better information from courts to the public about
the blameworthiness (or lack thereof) of the parties. See, e.g., Scott Baker & Albert Choi,
Contract’s Role in Relational Contract, 101 VA. L. REV. 559, 573–75 (2015).
27 PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE WORKING GRP., PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE: A COLLABORATIVE
PROJECT TO ENCOURAGE SUSTAINED CODE COMPLIANCE, INTERIM REPORT 5 (2005), https://
www.domini.com/uploads/legacy/Kaleidoscope_Interim_Report.pdf [hereinafter PRO-
JECT KALEIDOSCOPE INTERIM REPORT].
28 Africa: Child Labor in Cocoa Fields/Harkin-Engel Protocol, INT’L LABOUR ORG., https://
www.ilo.org/africa/technical-cooperation/accel-africa/WCMS_159486/lang—en/index
.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2019).
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Part III applies this typology to corporate compliance and identifies impor-
tant lessons for the institutional design of a treaty on business and human
rights.  Part IV uses two case studies to demonstrate how reputational crises
can encourage corporate actors to engage in organizational change concern-
ing their human rights compliance.  Part V discusses implications of this
typology, including concerns with “greenwashing” strategies, conditions for
successful organizational change, and possibilities for global change at a time
when rising nationalist tendencies and growing wariness of international
commitments appear to eschew future international institutions.
I. WHAT IS CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANCE?
A. From Multination Corporation to Globally Integrated Enterprise: The Benefits
of the Global Supply Chain to Transnational Corporations
Over a decade ago, Samuel Palmisano, chair of the board, president,
and CEO of IBM, wrote in Foreign Affairs that we are witnessing the transfor-
mation of multinational corporations into “globally integrated enterprises”
and with it, a change in corporate purpose: “The corporation, then, is emerg-
ing as a combination of various functions and skills—some tightly bound and
some loosely coupled—and it integrates these components of business activ-
ity and production on a global basis to produce goods and services for its
customers.”29
The tool that corporations use to connect their various functions around
the world is the global supply chain.30  There is a great variety in the types of
global supply chains around the world that differ in functions, locations,
workers, and governance models.31  For example, Starbucks’s operations
involve at least the following functions: production, transportation, storage,
manufacturing, distribution, retail, and customer service.32  Some of these
functions are performed by Starbucks while other functions are performed
by third-party vendors; all these functions—and the actors who perform
them—are connected to each other and to Starbucks through the latter’s
supply chain.33  The organization and performance of this supply chain can
play a critical role in a transnational corporation’s success.
29 Palmisano, supra note 4, at 129–31, 133.
30 Gary Gereffi, The Organization of Buyer Driven Global Commodity Chains: How U.S.
Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks, in COMMODITY CHAINS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM,
supra note 5, at 95, reprinted in GARY GEREFFI, GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS AND DEVELOPMENT 43,
44 (2018) (explaining that global commodity chains are characterized by “a set of products
and services linked together in a sequence of value-adding economic activities”).
31 Suk-Jun Lim & Joe Phillips, Embedding CSR Values: The Global Footwear Industry’s Evolv-
ing Governance Structure, 81 J. BUS. ETHICS 143, 146–48 (2008) (comparing market-based
governance models with alternative governance approaches that emphasize collaboration
and information sharing between buyers and suppliers).
32 James A. Cooke, From Bean to Cup: How Starbucks Transformed Its Supply Chain, SUPPLY
CHAIN Q. (2010), https://www.supplychainquarterly.com/topics/Procurement/scq201004
starbucks/.
33 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 11  7-JAN-20 14:49
2019] improving  human  rights  compliance  in  supply  chains 737
For example, in 2008, Starbucks faced a cost problem because of the
organization of its supply chain: its success had led to the rapid expansion of
its global footprint with new retail stores opening regularly.34  The growth in
operational costs led Howard Schultz, chairman, president, and CEO of
Starbucks, to prioritize reorganization of the supply chain in order to secure
Starbucks’s continued success.35
Another supply chain leader is Apple.  Research firm Gartner consist-
ently recognized Apple for leadership in supply chain management.36  Part
of Apple’s success—and why it has topped the list of supply chain leaders—is
that it was able “to discover and develop unique materials, coerce and cajole
suppliers, and churn out millions of units all without owning any factories.”37
But even Apple is not immune to supply chain problems, such as disruptions
and delays, that could place its broader operations at risk.38
Regardless of particular characteristics, most global supply chains share
the following features: geographic dispersion and functional specialization.  First,
more goods are made in more places.  One reason for the growing global
footprint for economic production is technology.39  Technological improve-
ments have enabled companies to shed their manufacturing responsibilities
while retaining a reliable manufacturing base.  For example, the bar code
enabled retailers to share sales and production information with their con-
tractors, thereby facilitating the offshoring of manufacturing.40  Finally, trade
policies also played an important role in facilitating supply chains.41  The
result is that there is more and more trade in intermediate goods—not fin-
ished products but components of products that cross borders repeatedly as
different economies add value to a component before exporting it to
another country that will do the same.42
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Gartner, Press Release, Gartner Announces Rankings of Its 2015 Supply Chain Top
25, (May 14, 2015) https://www.gartner.com/en/newsroom/press-releases/2015-05-14-
gartner-announces-rankings-of-its-2015-supply-chain-top-25 (announcing “masters cate-
gory” for supply chain leaders (capitalization altered)).




39 George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 955, 962, 964–965 (2007); Palmisano, supra note 4, at 129.
40 Richard Appelbaum & Nelson Lichtenstein, A New World of Retail Supremacy: Supply
Chains and Workers’ Chains in the Age of Wal-Mart, 70 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 106,
108 (2006).
41 Palmisano, supra note 4, at 128–29.
42 See Marcelo Prince & Willa Plank, A Short History of Apple’s Manufacturing in the U.S.,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 6, 2012), https://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/12/06/a-short-history-of-
apples-manufacturing-in-the-u-s/.  Global trade now embraces more and more exchange in
intermediate goods as an increasing proportion of components are imported into a coun-
try for subsequent use in an export.  Gary Gereffi & Joonkoo Lee, Why the World Suddenly
Cares About Global Supply Chains, J. SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT., July 2012, at 24, 26.
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Second, the tasks that suppliers perform not only occur in more places
but are also more specialized: specific corporations, tiers of corporations, and
even significant segments of national economies devote themselves to partic-
ular intermediary tasks in the production chain for a class of goods.43  What
we are witnessing is the division of labor for a particular good or service
among different countries and within segments of those countries.  The mar-
keting and design of a particular good may occur in country A, while
research and development is undertaken in country B, key components are
sourced from countries C–G, and components are assembled in country H
and distributed by vendors from country I to retail stores operated in coun-
tries A–I, with customer service performed by workers in country J.  This
organization does not only represent geographic distribution of functions
but also the specialization of certain economies in particular labor functions.
Such specialization and globalization are both a result of the globally inte-
grated enterprise and one of its enabling conditions.
B. From Corporate Social Responsibility to Human Rights Compliance: The Risks
of Governance Gaps in the Global Supply Chain
Supply chains are not only a source of strength for a transnational cor-
poration; they also pose risks of their own.  Certainly, there are inherent risks
of the supply chain: production disruption and delays, poor quality control,
and so forth.  But many of the risks that place transnational corporations in
the public spotlight have less to do with production issues and instead con-
cern the conditions under which products are produced or services ren-
dered.  In other words, these are issues of social compliance as opposed to
quality compliance.
Both types of compliance issues arise from similar problems relating to
the organization of global supply chains and the broader environment in
which they operate.  At a supply chain level, we confront another iteration of
the agency cost problem.  As the number of actors involved expands, it
becomes more difficult to manage them.  And this challenge is not unique to
social compliance: as corporations expand their global footprints, it becomes
more challenging to know and manage their various operations, creating
risks of compliance in issue areas as diverse as environment, anticorruption,
product quality, and human rights.44
The supply chain problem is further compounded given the cross-bor-
der nature of globalized production so that is may be difficult to apply and
enforce laws to transnational conduct; for example, the U.S. Supreme Court
refused to do so in Kiobel v. Dutch Petroleum because of concerns with the
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.45  Even when harms concern purely
domestic conduct, some jurisdictions refuse to enforce their laws because of
43 See, e.g., Gereffi & Lee, supra note 42, at 26–27.
44 Geis, supra note 39, at 966.
45 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013).
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state incapacity or fear of corporate flight, among other concerns.46  The
intersection of transnational business activity with state incapacity lead to sig-
nificant “governance gaps” in global supply chains:
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today lies
in the governance gaps created by globalization—between the scope and
impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to man-
age their adverse consequences.  These governance gaps provide the permis-
sive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds without
adequate sanctioning or reparation.47
Governance gaps create risks for both vulnerable populations and trans-
national corporations, albeit of a different nature.  For vulnerable popula-
tions, governance gaps create the risk of human rights abuses.  National
headlines and NGO reports provide regular accounts of significant human
rights abuses in the supply chains of many familiar companies, including
forced labor in shrimp supply chains,48 child labor in cocoa supply chains,49
and human trafficking in supply chains ranging from the extractive sector to
the services industries.50  Recent litigation in United States and abroad fur-
ther illustrates the human impact of transnational business conduct.51
Governance gaps concerning human rights compliance also create risks
for transnational corporations.  Specifically, these gaps create or increase liti-
gation, regulatory, and reputational risks for transnational corporations.  First,
even the Supreme Court’s decisions in Kiobel and, recently, Jesner v. Arab
Bank—severely restricting the availability of the Alien Tort Statute to address
human rights violations52—have not eliminated litigation concerning social
compliance in the supply chain.53  For example, in October 2018, the Ninth
Circuit permitted a class action case to proceed against Cargill and Nestle´
46 Ruggie, supra note 9, ¶ 14 (“Yet States, particularly some developing countries, may
lack the institutional capacity to enforce national laws and regulations against transna-
tional firms doing business in their territory even when the will is there, or they may feel
constrained from doing so by having to compete internationally for investment.  Home
States of transnational firms may be reluctant to regulate against overseas harm by these
firms because the permissible scope of national regulation with extraterritorial effect
remains poorly understood, or out of concern that those firms might lose investment
opportunities or relocate their headquarters.”).
47 Id. ¶ 3.
48 See, e.g., Sud v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 731 F. App’x 719, 720 (9th Cir. 2018); Wirth
v. Mars, Inc., 730 F. App’x 468, 468 (9th Cir. 2018).
49 See, e.g., Dana v. Hershey Co., 730 F. App’x 460, 460 (9th Cir. 2018); McCoy v. Nestle
USA, Inc., 730 F. App’x 462, 462 (9th Cir. 2018).
50 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 12–13 (2015), https://2009-
2017.state.gov/documents/organization/245365.pdf.
51 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 113, 123 (2013).
52 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1408 (2018).
53 See Doe v. Nestle, 906 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he Supreme Court in
Jesner held that foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. Jesner thus abrogates
Nestle I insofar as it applies to foreign corporations.  But Jesner did not eliminate all corpo-
rate liability under the ATS, and we therefore continue to follow Nestle I’s holding as
applied to domestic corporations.” (citation omitted)).
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brought by “former child slaves who were kidnapped and forced to work on
cocoa farms in the Ivory Coast for up to fourteen hours a day without pay.
While being forced to work on the cocoa farms, plaintiffs witnessed the beat-
ing and torture of other child slaves who attempted to escape.”54  The Ninth
Circuit stated that the nature of the operations allows the case to survive
Kiobel because “the allegations paint a picture of overseas slave labor that
defendants perpetuated from headquarters in the United States.”55  This
case is one of a number of cases over the past decade or so—before and after
Kiobel—that concerned human rights violations in the supply chain.56
In addition to litigation risks, governance gaps concerning social compli-
ance also create a regulatory risk for transnational corporations.  For exam-
ple, California introduced the Transparency in Supply Chains Act, which
requires covered corporations to disclose their efforts to ensure that their
supply chains are free from slavery and human trafficking, including infor-
mation about their practices concerning verification, audits, certifications,
internal accountability standards and procedures, and training.57  There
have also been various attempts to introduce an equivalent statute at the fed-
eral level.58
The United States is not alone in trying to regulate issues concerning
social compliance.  The United Kingdom already introduced its own Modern
Slavery Act in 2015,59 and more recently, Australia joined the ranks of coun-
tries addressing modern slavery with its own law that “requires companies of
a certain size operating in Australia to publicly state the steps they are taking
to keep their supply chains free from the worst forms of modern-day slav-
ery.”60  In 2018, a proposed federal bill was tabled in the Canadian House of
Commons that “would require companies to publicly release a report every
year, detailing what they’ve done to ensure their supply chains are transpar-
ent and free of goods and materials fully or partially produced by children
and forced labourers.”61  Switzerland and Germany are also considering simi-
lar legislation.62
France took a different approach by introducing a “Duty of Vigilance
Law” that requires the largest French companies to “publish annual, public
54 Id. at 1122.
55 Id. at 1126.
56 See, e.g., Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 679–80 (9th Cir. 2009); Presbyte-
rian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
57 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2019).
58 See, e.g., Business Supply Chain Transparency on Trafficking and Slavery Act of
2018, H.R. 7089, 115th Cong. (2018).
59 Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30.
60 Komala Ramachandra, Australia Starts Tackling Modern Slavery, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/09/australia-starts-tackling-
modern-slavery.
61 Samantha Beattie, Modern Slavery Bill Targets Canadian Imports of Goods Made by Slaves,
HUFFPOST (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.ca/2018/12/14/modern-slavery-
bill-john-mckay-forced-child-labour_a_23618530/.
62 See Ramachandra, supra note 60.
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vigilance plans . . . [that] include[ ] impacts linked to their own activities,
those of companies under their control, and those of suppliers and subcon-
tractors, with whom they have an established commercial relationship.”63
Additionally, “[w]hen companies default on these obligations, the law
empowers victims and other concerned parties to bring the issue before a
judge” who can “apply fines of up to C= 10 million when companies fail to
publish plans,” and “[f]ines can go up to C= 30 million if this failure resulted
in damages that would otherwise have been preventable.”64
Finally, there are also a number of proposals for new international insti-
tutions to regulate issues of human rights compliance.  Some have proposed
a new International Court of Civil Justice to address transnational mass tort
cases.65  Others propose a new set of Hague Rules for international arbitra-
tion of business and human rights cases.66  And, as discussed in Section I.C,
work continues on a new international treaty on business and human
rights.67  All these developments are in response to the harms created by
governance gaps in global supply chains.
The final risk to transnational corporations is reputational.  It is no
secret that a good reputation is a vital asset to corporations because it influ-
ences whether stakeholders will engage with them and on what terms.68  For
over a decade, the Reputation Institute has published an annual ranking of
the world’s one hundred most reputable companies.69  “Ethical behavior,
fairness, product value and transparency are among the most important fac-
tors in determining a company’s reputation.”70  In 2018, Apple took a signifi-
cant reputational hit, despite the many strengths of its supply chain.71
Apple’s reputational problem may be its very profitability; according to the
chief research officer of the Reputation Institute, “[b]eing viewed as highly
profitable has a negative perception in terms of corporate social responsibil-
ity . . . . Apple has really been punished in the court of public opinion.”72
63 Press Release, Eur. Coal. for Corp. Justice, France Adopts Corporate Duty of Vigi-
lance Law: A First Historic Step Towards Better Human Rights and Environmental Protec-




65 See, e.g., MAYA STEINITZ, THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CIVIL JUSTICE
(2019).
66 See e.g., BRUNO SIMMA ET AL., CTR. FOR INT’L LEGAL COOPERATION, INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS DISPUTES: ELEMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN
DRAFT ARBITRAL RULES, MODEL CLAUSES, AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE ARBITRAL PROCESS
(2018).
67 See infra Section I.C.
68 See infra Section II.A.
69 REPUTATION INST., supra note 1, at 41.
70 Vicky Valet, The World’s Most Reputable Companies 2018, FORBES (Mar. 15, 2018)
https://www.forbes.com/sites/vickyvalet/2018/03/15/the-worlds-most-reputable-compa
nies-2018/#318ad47526d5.
71 REPUTATION INST., supra note 1, at 45.
72 Valet, supra note 70 (quoting Stephen Hahn-Griffiths).
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One explanation for this reputational loss is that the public is looking for
signs of social contribution from successful companies.73
The supply chain of a transnational business can demonstrate its social
contribution to the world, for good or ill.  Reports of human trafficking,
modern slavery, child labor, forced displacements, and environmental con-
tamination provide a poor narrative of a business’s impact on the world; it is
not surprising when the reputation of a transnational business plummets
after such revelations.74  The litigation and regulatory risks discussed above
also contribute to reputation risk: the more light that legal institutions shine
on problems in supply chains, the more vulnerable transnational corpora-
tions are to negative evaluation and reputational damage.75  But supply
chains also offer opportunities for transnational corporations to demonstrate
their prosocial character when they go above and beyond what applicable
laws require concerning conditions in their supply chains.
C. Regulating the Supply Chain
Globalization has fueled expanding networks of global supply chains
and an ever-broadening corporate footprint.76  Over the decades, the inter-
national community experimented with several “hard-” and “soft-law”
approaches to counteract these permissive environments.  The following Sec-
tion discusses some of the most recent initiatives proposed or developed to
address the challenge of governing corporate activity across borders.  For
example, in 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the United
Nations Global Compact that promotes a set of values based on internation-
ally recognized documents, such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.77  The Global Compact is a voluntary initiative that imposes on its
corporate members a requirement to abide by its ten foundational princi-
ples, relating to human rights, labor, the environment, and anticorruption,
as well as to report annually on its progress toward these commitments.78
A few years later in 2003, the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights adopted the Norms on the Responsibilities
73 Id.; see also CONE COMMC’NS, 2017 CONE COMMUNICATIONS CSR STUDY 2, 31 (2017),
http://www.conecomm.com/2017-cone-communications-csr-study-pdf.
74 See, e.g., Edwin Lopez & Jennifer McKevitt, The 5 Most Notorious Supply Chain Ethics
Scandals of 2016, SUPPLY CHAIN DIVE (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.supplychaindive.com/
news/top-2016-ethics-slavery-supply-chain-scandals/432391/.
75 SIMMONS, supra note 16, at 132 (“[L]itigation’s power resides not so much in its
ability to provide every victim with a decisive win in court.  Litigation is also a political
strategy . . . .  It can often be used strategically not only to win cases, but also to publicize
and mobilize a cause.”).
76 See supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text.
77 Press Release, Secretary-General, Executive Summary and Conclusion of High-Level
Meeting on Global Compact, U.N. Press Release SG/2065 (July 27, 2000) [hereinafter
Press Release, U.N. Global Compact].
78 See The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, https://www
.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (last visited Oct. 19, 2019); Georg
Kell et al., Silent Reform Through the Global Compact, UN CHRON., Mar. 2007, at 26, 26.
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of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises (“Norms”)
that were intended as a standard code of conduct for transnational corpora-
tions.79  The Norms became controversial because of a number of their
prominent features, including recognizing transnational corporations as duty
bearers of human rights standards with particular human rights obligations
of transnational corporations.80  The Norms were also presented as
mandatory as opposed to voluntary.  It is no surprise, therefore, that several
global trade associations explicitly objected to the Norms.81  It is also proba-
bly equally unsurprising that the Norms were effectively tabled in 2004, with
the UN Commission on Human Rights deciding to subject the Norms to
additional study.82
But the end of the Norms did not mark the end of the business and
human rights agenda.  Instead, in 2008, the UN Special Representative on
Business and Human Rights, John Ruggie, introduced his tripartite frame-
work for business and human rights known as the “Protect, Respect and Rem-
edy Framework.”83  This framework consists of three important but separate
pillars: (a) the state’s duty to protect against human rights abuses by third
parties; (b) the corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and (c)
greater access by victims to effective remedies, both judicial and
nonjudicial.84
Three years later, UN Special Representative Ruggie introduced the
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (“Guiding
Principles”)  that provide thirty-one principles that help to operationalize the
79 David Kinley et al., The Politics of Corporate Social Responsibility: Reflections on the United
Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations, 25 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 30, 31 (2007) (“The
Norms comprise a set of human rights obligations directed at companies, but which would
be imposed upon them by way of the usual means of international law, namely, the domes-
tic laws of individual states.”).
80 U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm’n on Human Rights, Subcomm. on Promotion
and Prot. of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, art. 2, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26 2003) (listing duties relating to the right to equal opportu-
nity and nondiscriminatory treatment, right to security of persons, rights of workers, and
respect for national sovereignty and human rights).
81 See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS, JOINT VIEWS OF THE
IOE AND ICC ON THE DRAFT “NORMS ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORA-
TIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS” 3 (2004), https:/
/bit.ly/2Ujkl3W (“Only States have legal obligations, so only States can fulfil human
rights . . . .  Private persons are not the duty-bearers of the rights in the UN human rights
treaties, and related agreements: consequently, private actors cannot violate human
rights.”); see also Thomas M.T. Niles, UN Code No Help to Companies, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 17,
2003, at 18; Daniel Vasella, Business Must Help Frame New Human Rights Rules, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2004, at 19; Letter from Maria L. Cattaui, Secretary-General, Int’l Chamber of Com-
merce, to Dzidek Kedzia, Chief, Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, United
Nations 5 (Sept. 7, 2004).
82 Kinley et al., supra note 79, at 32.
83 See Ruggie, supra note 9.
84 Id.
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Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework.85  The Guiding Principles
expanded on each of the three pillars, including the corporate responsibility
to respect human rights.  According to the Guiding Principles, a company’s
responsibility for due diligence includes evaluating (a) the “country contexts
in which their business activities take place, to highlight any specific human
rights challenges they may pose”; (b) “human rights impacts their own activi-
ties may have within that context—for example, in their capacity as produc-
ers, service providers, employers, and neighbours”; and (c) “whether they
might contribute to abuse through the relationships connected to their activ-
ities, such as with business partners, suppliers, State agencies, and other non-
State actors.”86  Appropriate due diligence requires formulating a firm-spe-
cific human rights policy, impact assessments, integration of the human
rights policy throughout the firm, and tracking performance through moni-
toring and auditing.87
There are promising signs that the Guiding Principles—including the
corporate responsibility to respect—have caught on.  The Guiding Principles
have been incorporated, in whole or in part, into a number of industry and
multi-industry codes and guides, including the OECD Guidelines for Mul-
tinational Corporations,88 International Bar Association Practical Guide,89
IPIECA (oil and gas industry) human rights due diligence practical guide,90
and the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service
Providers.91
While the Guiding Principles may provide the current language for busi-
ness and human rights, not everyone is impressed.  Analysis by the Business
and Human Rights Resource Centre identified three major weaknesses con-
cerning compliance with the “corporate responsibility to respect” between
2011–2016: (1) “[a] sense of impunity for corporate human rights abuses in
many countries”; (2) a “[l]ow-recognition of business [and] human rights
issues among firms [headquartered] in significant emerging economies”; and
(3) “[a] lack of understanding on how to implement respect for human
85 See U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R, GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSI-
NESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4–34 (2011).
86 See Ruggie, supra note 9, ¶ 57.
87 Id. ¶¶ 59–63.
88 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 3 (2011), https://bit.ly/1kPDOqW (introducing a new chapter on human
rights).
89 INT’L BAR ASS’N, IBA PRACTICAL GUIDE ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS FOR BUSI-
NESS LAWYERS 7 (2016), https://bit.ly/2CPnLUK.
90 INT’L PETROLEUM INDUS. ENVTL. CONSERVATION ASS’N, HUMAN RIGHTS DUE DILI-
GENCE PROCESS 2 (2012), https://bit.ly/2HAhXo3.
91 GENEVA ACAD. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN LAW & HUMAN RIGHTS, THE INTERNATIONAL
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICE PROVIDERS 9 (2013), https://bit.ly/
2SeDQNw.
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rights in practice.”92  In 2018, the UN Working Group on Business and
Human Rights reported “gaps in current practice in corporate disclosure of
risk assessments and human rights due diligence processes, as well as the
‘taking action’ and ‘tracking of responses’ components of human rights due
diligence.”93
Due to these and similar concerns, the United Nations Human Rights
Council adopted a resolution in 2014 “to establish an open-ended intergov-
ernmental working group” with the “mandate . . . to elaborate an interna-
tional legally binding instrument” on “transnational corporations and other
business enterprises” with respect to human rights.”94  However, it was a con-
troversial move from the onset, garnering support from twenty countries,95
opposition from another fourteen countries,96 with thirteen additional coun-
tries abstaining.97
92 5 Years On: The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, BUS. & HUMAN
RIGHTS RES. CTR., https://business-humanrights.org/en/ungps-at-5 (last visited Oct. 27,
2019).
93 Summary: Corporate Human Rights Due Diligence, supra note 9; see U.N. Human
Rights Council, Report on the Fourth Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental
Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Respect to Human Rights, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/48 (Jan. 2, 2019) [hereinafter
Report on the Fourth Session] (reporting that several delegations and NGOs noted “multi-
ple reasons for further developments in the field of business and human rights” including
the “unfair power imbalance between companies and rights holders, the growing power of
companies vis-a`-vis States, the increased scope of the rights granted to companies on the
international stage without corresponding obligations and the lack of effective regulation
in conflict and post-conflict settings”); see also JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT MODERN
SLAVERY BILL, REPORT ON DRAFT MODERN SLAVERY BILL, 2013–4, HL 166, HC 1019, ¶ 169
(UK) (reporting the concern that “voluntary agreements would not be afforded high busi-
ness priority” because, as former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large Luis CdeBaca warned,
“[v]oluntary codes of practice in corporations typically get done by their corporate social
responsibility people, whereas mandatory regulations end up being handled by their gen-
eral counsel and even their directors because they are part of a filing requirement”); Vir-
ginia Mantouvalou, The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 Three Years On, 81 MOD. L. REV. 1017,
1042–43 (2018) (describing strengths and weaknesses of the UK Modern Slavery Act for
incentivizing companies to improve social compliance in supply chains).
94 U.N. Human Rights Council, Elaboration of an International Legally Binding
Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to
Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014).
95 Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Congo, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Ethiopia, India,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, South
Africa, Venezuela, and Vietnam all voted in favor. UN Human Rights Council Sessions, BUS.
& HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/binding-treaty/
un-human-rights-council-sessions (last visited Oct. 21, 2019).
96 Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Montene-
gro, South Korea, Romania, Macedonia, United Kingdom, and United States all voted in
opposition. Id.
97 Argentina, Botswana, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Gabon, Kuwait, Maldives, Mexico,
Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, and United Arab Emirates all abstained. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 20  7-JAN-20 14:49
746 notre dame law review [vol. 95:2
In July 2018, the open-ended intergovernmental working group released
the text of a “zero draft”98 of the proposed treaty, with a revised draft pub-
lished in 2019.99  While many provisions address the biggest criticism of the
Guiding Principles—inadequate access to remedies—article 5 of the revised
draft is significant because it addresses the prevention of human rights
abuses and speaks to the type of conduct that we want from transnational
corporations, as opposed to state actors.100  It addresses human rights due
diligence responsibilities of corporations, including the following: monitor-
ing human rights impacts of business activities; identifying and assessing any
actual or potential human rights activities that may arise; taking appropriate
action to prevent human rights violations; and communicating with stake-
holders on “the policies and measures adopted to identify, assess, prevent
and monitor any actual or potential human rights violations or abuses that
may arise.”101
These draft texts were not without their critics.  Concerns raised by
NGOs and civil society criticized the initial zero draft for not going far
enough to protect human rights, pointing out the lack of protection for
human rights defenders;102 failure to prescribe direct obligations for busi-
ness corporations;103 failure to adequately address gender discrimination
and power imbalances, within stakeholder engagement and more broadly;104
risk of excluding certain types of corporations, such as state-owned enter-
prises;105 and insufficient extraterritorial obligations of state actors,106
among other concerns.
At the other end, the International Organisation of Employers (IOE),
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), Business & Industry Advisory
Committee to the OECD (BIAC), and Business Europe also took aim at the
98 U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Comm’r, Zero Draft, Legally Binding Instru-
ment to Regulate, in International Human Rights Law, the Activities of Transnational Cor-
porations and Other Business Enterprises (July 16, 2018).
99 Revised Draft, supra note 13.
100 Id. art. 5.
101 Id.
102 See Carlos Lopez, Human Rights Defenders and Corporate Accountability—Is There a Place
for Them in a Treaty on Business & Human Rights?, in COMPILATION OF COMMENTARIES ON THE
“ZERO DRAFT” 6, 6 (2018) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON THE “ZERO DRAFT”]; Report on
the Fourth Session, supra note 93, ¶ 20.
103 See Charlie Holt et al., The Zero Draft Legally Binding Instrument on Business and
Human Rights: Small Steps Along the Irresistible Path to Corporate Accountability, in COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE “ZERO DRAFT,” supra note 102, at 9, 10.
104 See Felogene Anumo & Inna Michaeli, Justice Not “Special Attention”: Feminist Visions
for the Binding Treaty, in COMMENTARIES ON THE “ZERO DRAFT,” supra note 102, at 20, 21.
105 See Maddalena Neglia, The Publication of the “Zero Draft” Documents Is Positive News, but
It Calls for Much Further Discussion, in COMMENTARIES ON THE “ZERO DRAFT,” supra note 102,
at 28, 28.
106 See Raphaela Lopes & Arnold Kwesiga, What the Zero Draft and Protocol Lack: Meaning-
ful Access to Justice—A Global South Perspective, in COMMENTARIES ON THE “ZERO DRAFT,” supra
note 102, at 34, 34.
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draft texts.107  One concern with the initial zero draft was their view that it
relied exclusively on sanctions to encourage the desired business conduct,108
a concern also observed by members of civil society that still applies to the
revised draft.109  But whereas members of civil society faulted the zero draft
for not going far enough to impose direct obligations on TNCs the trade
associations faulted the zero draft for leaving that door ajar through vague
language.110
But these concerns—from both ends of the policy spectrum—miss the
fundamental weakness of the draft texts: state cooperation.  As a prospective
treaty, it requires the consent of states to enter into force.  Its very creation is
therefore dependent on the support of states.  Even if a treaty emerges, it
binds states even though the real targets of the treaty are corporations.
Despite industry concerns, it appears that the draft text attempts to constrain
the real target through a familiar route: bind states so that they will, in turn,
bind TNCs within their territories or otherwise under their “jurisdiction and
control.”  For example, due diligence under article 5 requires that states
implement domestic legislation that obligates TNCs to perform due dili-
gence as set forth in the revised draft.111
Unfortunately, there are signs that states may not support this treaty.  It
was a very close vote of the UN Human Rights Council that led to work on
this prospective treaty, with fourteen countries opposing the resolution and
thirteen abstaining from the vote, leaving only twenty supporters.112  This
problem grows when we consider the identity of the opponents: Austria,
Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Montene-
gro, South Korea, Romania, Macedonia, United Kingdom, and United
States.113  These are the home states of many of the largest transnational
corporations in the world.  Even if a treaty enters into force, their coopera-
tion is necessary to make the treaty work as designed, such as by implement-
ing the necessary legislation that effectuates the provisions of the draft
text.114  As designed, the draft treaty does not reach the TNCs but through
the channel of their home states.
The draft treaty is also vulnerable to challenges that have very little to do
with it in particular and concerns the reality of multilateral treaty making
107 INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS ET AL., BUSINESS RESPONSE TO THE ZERO DRAFT LEGALLY BIND-
ING INSTRUMENT TO REGULATE, IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, THE ACTIVITIES OF
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (“ZERO DRAFT TREATY”)
AND THE DRAFT OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT (“DRAFT
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL”) ANNEX (2018), https://bit.ly/2CsAWwk.
108 Id. at 7–8.
109 Surya Deva, The Zero Draft of the Proposed Business and Human Rights Treaty, Part II: On
the Right Track, but Not Ready Yet, in COMMENTARIES ON THE “ZERO DRAFT,” supra note 102, at
24, 24.
110 INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS ET AL., supra note 107, at 10.
111 Revised Draft, supra note 13, art. 5.
112 UN Human Rights Council Sessions, supra note 95.
113 Id.
114 Report on the Fourth Session, supra note 93, at 6–7.
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today.  Some scholars warn of “stagnation” in multilateral treaty making,
making it harder to get treaties off the ground.115  It is especially difficult
when the treaty concerns human rights; these treaties can prove controversial
enough to chill state support, as evidenced by the number of human rights
treaties that the United States has yet to ratify or even sign.116  Finally, we
cannot ignore the political realities of the moment we occupy now.  National-
ist sentiment is supplanting global sensibilities in many areas of the world,
rendering it unlikely that state leaders can “sell” yet another global treaty—
with its attendant “entangling commitments”—to their constituents.
However, these are only insurmountable problems if the treaty relies on
states to reach transnational corporate conduct.  But what if there were a way
for the treaty, in draft or final form, to shortcut states and reach its intended
business audience directly?
II. EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE THROUGH REPUTATION
This Part explains the significance of reputational mechanisms for
encouraging compliance with international institutions, particularly treaties.
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify some terminology: institutions are
“the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” and
“include any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape human
interaction.”117  In the context of international business, institutions include
international treaties, industry codes of conduct, and multistakeholder initia-
tives; all these institutions provide the “rules of the game” for the conduct of
transnational corporations.118  In contrast, organizations are the players in the
game: transnational corporations, NGOs, United Nations, shareholders,
etc.119  The combination of institutions (rules) and organizations (players)
structures the choices that transnational corporations and national states
encounter in the international arena.
Section A begins by explaining the significance of reputational incen-
tives for the type of actor that is the primary audience for global social com-
pliance: transnational corporations.  Drawing upon research in reputation
management and communications studies, this Section explains the strategic
115 Joost Pauwelyn et al., When Structures Become Shackles: Stagnation and Dynamics in Inter-
national Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 733, 734–35 (2014).
116 Marie Wilken, U.S. Aversion to International Human Rights Treaties, GLOB. JUSTICE CTR.
(June 22, 2017), http://globaljusticecenter.net/blog/773-u-s-aversion-to-international-
human-rights-treaties (“The United States . . . still has not ratified many significant human
rights treaties, including the Convention on the Rights of Persons With Disabilities and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights—part of the Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights.  The United States also has not ratified the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), one of only seven
countries who hasn’t[,] including Iran, Nauru, Palau, Somalia, Sudan and Tonga.  The
United States and Somalia are the only countries that have not ratified Convention on the
Rights of the Child.”).
117 NORTH, supra note 17, at 3–4.
118 Id. at 4–5.
119 Id.
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value of a reputation to a corporation and the strategies that a corporation
may draw upon to repair its reputation following a crisis.  Section B provides
a brief literature review of international legal theories exploring the role of
reputational mechanisms for encouraging compliance by state actors.  It pro-
vides this overview through a typology of reputational mechanisms that dis-
tinguish between incentives for adopting versus abiding by international
treaty norms and incentives provided by other treaty members versus exter-
nal actors.  Finally, Section C explains the significance of this typology for
institutional design purposes and applies this analysis to business actors.
A. The Value of a Reputation
According to reputation expert Charles Fombrun, a “corporate reputa-
tion is a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions and future
prospects that describe the firm’s overall appeal to all of its key constituents
when compared with other leading rivals.”120  There are two main reasons to
focus on a corporation’s reputation in order to design governance strategies
for it: asset and dependence.
First, a positive reputation is an asset to a corporation because it influ-
ences whether its key stakeholders will want to interact with it and the terms
upon which they will want to interact.121  These stakeholders rely on reputa-
tion when deciding whether to provide a corporation with something it
needs in order to succeed: investors provide capital,122 employees provide
talent,123 consumers provide revenue,124 suppliers provide product sourcing
120 CHARLES J. FOMBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE FROM THE CORPORATE IMAGE 72
(1996); see also David L. Deephouse, Media Reputation as a Strategic Resource: An Integration of
Mass Communication and Resource-Based Theories, 26 J. MGMT. 1091, 1093 (2000) (“A firm’s
reputation is produced by the interactions of the firm with its stakeholders and by informa-
tion about the firm and its actions circulated among stakeholders, including specialized
information intermediaries.”); Yuri Mishina et al., The Path Dependence of Organizational Rep-
utation: How Social Judgment Influences Assessments of Capability and Character, 33 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 459, 460 (2012) (“Organizational reputation is defined as the collective, stake-
holder group-specific assessment regarding an organization’s capability to create value
based on its characteristics and qualities.”); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defama-
tion Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 693–96 (1986) (discussing
reputation as property).
121 See, e.g., Edward M. Iacobucci, On the Interaction Between Legal and Reputational Sanc-
tions, 43 J. LEGAL. STUD. 189, 190–91 (2014).
122 See generally DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER (2018).
123 See John Dodge, The War for Tech Talent Escalates, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 19, 2016, at G1
(describing the fierce competition for software engineers and other employees in Massa-
chusetts’s tech industry).
124 See Michael L. Barnett & Andrew J. Hoffman, Beyond Corporate Reputation: Managing
Reputational Interdependence, 11 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 1, 4 (2008); Morten Thanning
Vendelø, Narrating Corporate Reputation: Becoming Legitimate Through Storytelling, INT’L STUD.
MGMT. & ORG., Fall 1998, at 120, 120; see also Hess & Dunfee, supra note 24, at 17 (explain-
ing information asymmetries between firms and stakeholders).
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and support,125 and communities provide the social license to operate.126  A
corporate reputation influences these actors’ decisions to interact with a cor-
poration because that reputation may provide stakeholders with the only
information they have about the corporation and upon which they can pre-
dict its future conduct.
Second, while important, a reputation is not self-created; instead, it is a
product of what other people think about you.127  You can influence your own
reputation, but you are not its author.128  A corporation cultivates its reputa-
tion by influencing the views of others about itself, primarily its key constitu-
ents such as investors, consumers, suppliers, employees, and regulators.129
Therefore, a corporation’s reputation rises and falls based on what these dif-
ferent actors think about it.130  These two attributes of reputation—as an
asset that is created by others—provide external stakeholders with some level
of leverage over a corporation.131  The following Sections outline the differ-
125 See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Governance in
Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561, 606 (2015) (“[E]ven firms as powerful as
Apple are deeply concerned about their reputation for treating suppliers fairly.”).
126 See, e.g., Nicholas Bariyo & Jacquie McNish, Tanzania’s Tougher Mining Laws Rattle
Companies, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tanzanias-tougher-
mining-laws-rattles-companies-1501666200 (reporting that mining companies in Tanzania
confront increasing pressure from the government in what President Magufuli described
as his “economic war,” including export bans, restrictions on foreign travel, and demands
for billions of dollars in back taxes, penalties, and interest); Tsvetana Paraskova, Nigerian
Protesters Storm Shell Crude Oil Flow Station, OILPRICE.COM (Aug. 11, 2017), https://oilprice
.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Nigerian-Protesters-Storm-Shell-Crude-Oil-Flow-
Station.html (describing how hundreds of protesters attacked a Shell-owned crude flow
station “protesting against lack of jobs,” “demanding infrastructure development,” “asking
for an end to oil pollution in the Niger Delta[,] and claim[ing] that they were not benefit-
ing from the oil-rich resources in the restive area”). But see, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, THE
DEATH OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 4 (2013) (explaining that reputational capital may not
matter as much in some markets because of the effects of regulation on contracting
decisions).
127 FOMBRUN, supra note 120, at 59; E. Geoffrey Love & Matthew Kraatz, Character, Con-
formity, or the Bottom Line? How and Why Downsizing Affected Corporate Reputation, 52 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 314, 314 (2009) (“Corporate reputation is an important asset (or liability)
bestowed upon a firm by external audiences.”).
128 See, e.g., Kishanthi Parella, Reputational Regulation, 67 DUKE L.J. 907, 930–55 (2018)
(discussing reputational sanctions for organizational defendants).
129 See Stelios Zyglidopoulos & Nelson Phillips, Responding to Reputational Crises: A Stake-
holder Perspective, 2 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 333, 335 (1999) (“Reputation is, therefore, fun-
damentally a stakeholder-based concept; it grows out of a stakeholder relationship and it is
shaped, if not determined, by that relationship.”); see also Post, supra note 120, at 692.
130 See FOMBRUN, supra note 120, at 81 (“Corporate reputations have bottom-line
effects.  A good reputation enhances profitability because it attracts customers to the com-
pany’s products, investors to its securities, and employees to its jobs.  In turn, esteem
inflates the price at which a public company’s securities trade.”).
131 However, while the potential for leverage is there, it is important to be realistic
about its limitations.  Specifically, the extent of leverage depends on the value of a reputa-
tion to a corporation and its vulnerability to reputational damage. See Nicole Deitelhoff &
Klaus Dieter Wolf, Business and Human Rights: How Corporate Norm Violators Become Norm
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ent types of leverage that can result from reputational mechanisms and the
ways those mechanisms influence corporate conduct.
B. A Typology of Reputational Mechanisms
In order to understand the potential of reputational mechanisms in
international institutions, we need to start with how reputation affects the
behavior of the traditional focus of international governance: states.  This
Section provides a typology of reputational mechanisms that can encourage
state actors to both commit to international treaties and to comply with those
treaty obligations.  This framework adopts Thomas Risse and Stephen Ropp’s
definitions for two types of organizational change: commitment and compliance.
According to Risse and Ropp, commitment refers to an organizational stage
where “actors accept international human rights as valid and binding for
themselves,” whereas compliance is the “sustained behavior and domestic
practices that conform to the international human rights norms.”132
This typology is based on international law scholarship examining the
role of reputational mechanisms for encouraging state compliance with
international treaties.133  While states and corporations have different stake-
holders and different incentives, both of these actors value reputation and
respond to reputational mechanisms.  By illustrating the dynamics of reputa-
tional governance for states, we can get a picture of how international treaties
and other institutions can similarly incentivize TNCs using reputational
mechanisms.
Reputation requires an audience, one that makes judgments about an
actor and provides benefits or sanctions based on those judgments.134  When
that audience is comprised of actors who are also members of the same
treaty, the reputational mechanisms they wield are internal because they are
produced by parties within the shared treaty.135  In contrast, external reputa-
tional mechanisms occur when the primary reputational benefits or costs for
Entrepreneurs, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS 222, 230 (Thomas Risse et al.
eds., 2013) (discussing the importance of brand value for social vulnerability of corpora-
tions).  Some corporations are particularly sensitive to reputational damage because con-
sumers pay a premium because of the brand’s value. See generally Hal R. Varian, Who Really
Makes the iPod?, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/28/tech
nology/28iht-ipod.1.6378095.html.  However, not all corporations are equally sensitive to
reputational shifts.
132 Thomas Risse & Stephen C. Ropp, Introduction and Overview, in THE PERSISTENT
POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 131, at 3, 9–10 (emphasis omitted).
133 See, e.g., Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231,
242 (2009); Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—And Not Trade,
13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623, 638 (2010); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of
International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823, 1849 (2002); Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L.
Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171, 171 (2010).
134 See, e.g., Fombrun, supra note 18; Mishina et al., supra note 120, at 459.
135 See, e.g., Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 305–06; see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 157–59.
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adopting and adhering to a treaty are provided by actors who are not parties
to that treaty (Table 1).136
TABLE 1
Reputational Explanations for State Compliance with  
Legally Binding International Institutions  
 Internal External 
Commitment 
Type 1 
Reputational gains of  
membership from  
“insiders” 
Type 2 
Reputational gains of  




Benefit of reciprocal  
obligations 
Type 4 
Credibility of future  
commitments 
Internal reputational mechanisms are incentives that are incorporated
into the institution itself because the reputational gains or losses come from
the other members of the institution.  A Type 1 reputational mechanism
refers to a situation when a state adopts an institution in order to enhance its
reputation among the other parties to that institution.  In contrast, a Type 2
reputational mechanism is one where a state joins an institution in order to
improve its reputation among actors not party to the institution.137
For example, both types of reputational mechanisms explain why states
that never intend to comply with the terms of a human rights treaty join it
nonetheless.138  Oona Hathaway identifies reputational benefits for state
“positioning” where “treaties offer rewards ‘for positions rather than for
effects.’”139  Specifically, treaty membership can satisfy the expectations of
potential investors or state donors who
seek[ ] evidence of commitment to the norms embedded in the human
rights treaties that they can in turn use to placate more genuinely interested
parties to which they must answer (including stockholders and customers of
companies wishing to invest in the country and constituents of governments
that wish to provide aid to or engage in deeper political or economic ties
with the ratifying countries).140
136 See, e.g., Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 306–08; see also infra Section IV.A.
137 See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 16, at 13 (“As more countries—especially regional
peers—ratify human rights accords, it becomes more difficult to justify nonadherence and
to deflect criticism for remaining a nonparty.”).
138 Hathaway, supra note 16, at 2007.
139 Id. (quoting DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 132
(1974)).
140 Id. at 2009.
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For those reasons, “[c]ountries that are parties to the treaties can therefore
enjoy the benefits of ratification without actually supplying the human rights
protections to which they have committed.”141
While Types 1 and 2 reputational mechanisms explain why state actors
join treaties, Types 3 and 4 reputational mechanisms explain why they com-
ply.  After all, if a state actor already gains reputational benefits just by join-
ing a treaty, then it must gain additional reputational benefits (or suffer
reputational losses) for it to comply.  The reputational benefits of compli-
ance can originate from within a treaty (Type 3) or from without (Type 4).
In a Type 3 reputational mechanism, state parties keep their commitments
out of concern that defection, if discovered, would discourage the other state
parties from cooperating with it in the future when it needs those states to
keep their commitments to it.142  In contrast, a Type 4 reputational mecha-
nism is one where state actors not party to the treaty nonetheless provide
incentives for compliance with it.143  External state actors provide these types
of incentives through either current treaty relationships or the prospect of
potential treaty relationships in the future.
The importance of these mechanisms for encouraging state compliance
depends on whether the international institution (such as a treaty or “soft
law” guideline) provides private benefits or public goods.  Some interna-
tional institutions create private benefits for participants so that participants
comply because they do not want to endanger their ability to enjoy these
benefits.  This incentive for compliance is based on reciprocity: if I don’t
help you when you need it, you will not help me when I need it.  This reputa-
tional mechanism works when the other parties to the international institu-
tion have something to give that the potential defector desires.144
For example, the market access rules of the WTO (World Trade Organi-
zation) are respected because the state parties have an ongoing interest in
free trade: “The prospect of being denied market access by a trade partner
lessens the temptation to defect now.”145  In international finance, regulators
may “rely on another in order to gain access to witnesses or evidence con-
cerning a domestic violation that may be located in another jurisdiction.”146
Failing to live up to one’s commitments increases the likelihood that another
regulator will not share information or assist with access to key witnesses in
the future when the potential defector needs it.147
141 Id.
142 See, e.g., Brummer, supra note 133, at 625; Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 16, at
305–06 (describing “internal outcasting”).
143 See, e.g., Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 306–08 (describing “external
outcasting”).
144 See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 16, at 116; Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 340.
145 See, e.g., SIMMONS, supra note 16, at 117.
146 Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t), 99 GEO.
L.J. 257, 285 (2011).
147 Brummer, supra note 133, at 638.
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However, reciprocity cannot always fuel compliance because not all insti-
tutional arrangements offer private benefits to their members.  Oona
Hathaway and Scott Shapiro identify this as a particular problem with human
rights treaties that create legal obligations upon states but do not offer them
private benefits for cooperation (besides contributing to the improved wel-
fare of humanity).  Here, Hathaway and Shapiro point out that in-kind sanc-
tions are impractical for ensuring state compliance: one state party to a
human rights treaty cannot respond to another state’s violations of that treaty
by suspending its human rights commitments to its own citizens.148  Instead,
they advocate for “cross-countermeasures” that offer non-in-kind sanctions:
“[R]ather than threaten torture in response to torture, the regime threatens
exclusion from the private benefits generated by the broader set of relation-
ships of which the human rights agreement is a part.”149
This type of reputational sanction for noncompliance is exercised by
both current treaty partners, which threaten to withhold benefits from
existing treaty arrangements, and future treaty partners.  In this latter situa-
tion, a state that is not party to the same treaty as state Y, for example, is
watching state Y’s performance under that treaty for clues as to the likeli-
hood that state Y would honor treaty commitments to it in the future.150  As
Andrew Guzman explains, “[a] country that develops a reputation for com-
pliance with international obligations signals to other countries that it is
cooperative.  This allows the state to enjoy long-term relationships with other
cooperative states, provides a greater ability to make binding promises, and
reduces the perceived need for monitoring and verification.”151  In contrast,
states with poor reputations for compliance will encounter greater difficulties
with making their future commitments credible, increasing the risks that
“potential partners are less willing to offer concessions in exchange for a
promised course of action.”152
148 Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 320; see also SIMMONS, supra note 16, at 123;
Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 314 (“Denying in-kind benefits simply means deny-
ing the outcast the same kind, class, or category of benefits that the outcast denied to other
members by breaking the rules of the regime.”).
149 Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 321 (explaining how the threatened penalty
for extreme noncompliance with the European Convention on Human Rights “is exclu-
sion from the Council of Europe and all the benefits of membership that come with it”).
150 SIMMONS, supra note 16, at 120.
151 Guzman, supra note 133, at 1849.  See also Brewster, supra note 133, at 242, for an
explanation of the rationalist account based on reputation:
States have reputations that extend into the indefinite future and potentially
apply across issue areas.  States care about their reputations because they are
engaged in cooperative activities with other states and continued interaction
depends, at least in part, on having a good reputation for cooperation.  As a con-
sequence, states count reputational loss due to non-compliance with international
law as a cost that is balanced against the possible benefits of such actions.  Reputa-
tional concerns make state compliance with international law more likely because
a bad reputation leads to less cooperative opportunities in the future.
152 Guzman, supra note 133, at 1850.
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One or more of these reputational mechanisms can encourage state
compliance with international treaties when other methods of securing com-
pliance—such as enforcement mechanisms—are weak or absent.  The follow-
ing Section applies this typology to the conduct of corporations under
international institutions.
C. Adapting the Typology for a Corporate Audience
Understanding the reasons why states comply with international law can
reveal important insights about the conditions under which corporations
may similarly comply.  However, we need to adapt features of the framework
when analyzing business conduct.  The first change is definitional: when we
talk about corporations, commitment to human rights refers to instances
“when companies publicly declare their acceptance of human rights norms
by either statements of compliance with international human rights law, by
acceding to national, regional or global CSR-initiatives or by issuing company
codes of conduct.”153  In contrast, corporations practice compliance “when
they begin to institutionalize human rights within the company, i.e. when
companies incorporate human rights norms into their management struc-
tures and risk management strategies or establish CSR units or
departments.”154
Second, while reputational mechanisms exercise similar effects on cor-
porate actors, the “carrots and sticks” change: business actors commit to insti-
tutions that are not binding on them because of benefits offered by either
members of that institution or external parties.  For example, a commitment
to an institution can secure a business’s place in a particular industry or
multi-industry association.  The members of that association may offer bene-
fits to a business that join it or external stakeholders, like consumers, may
reward companies that join that institution.  Similarly, a business may want to
comply with the institution because of fear of sanction by the other members
of that institution, such as suspension or expulsion, or risk to future coopera-
tion from these members.  A business may also comply with its commitments
when external stakeholders monitor its behavior, violations are observable,
and stakeholders levy sanctions (or offer rewards) for noncompliance (or
compliance).
III. USING REPUTATIONAL MECHANISMS TO IMPROVE TREATY DESIGN:
CHALLENGES WITH CREATING SELF-ENFORCING AGREEMENTS
FOR PUBLIC GOODS
The value of reputational mechanisms for legal institutions, such as mul-
tilateral treaties, is that they make an international agreement “self-enforc-
ing” so that “two or more parties adhere to the agreement as long as each
gains more from continuing the agreement than from abrogating it.”155  Self-
153 Deitelhoff & Wolf, supra note 131, at 226.
154 Id.
155 SIMMONS, supra note 16, at 116.
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enforcing agreements help address the problem of compliance because
“[t]he nature of the agreement itself provides incentives for the actors to
stick to it even in the absence of external enforcement mechanisms.”156
Therefore, ideally, reputational mechanisms can improve the reach and
effectiveness of a legal institution that otherwise suffers from enforcement
problems.  In the global social compliance context, reputational mechanisms
could encourage business actors to comply with the BHR treaty’s norms, such
as article 5’s provision on due diligence, even if state actors refuse to adopt or
implement the treaty.
The power of internal reputational mechanisms comes from reciproc-
ity.157  Compliance with a treaty is in the party’s interest when such compli-
ance is visible and contributes to its reputation as a cooperative treaty
member; here, the other treaty members are the primary audience for a state
party’s compliance.158  Compliance leads to a positive reputation while defec-
tion leads to the opposite.  Of course, state parties may not care about their
reputations unless there are consequences attached to those reputations; this
is why reciprocity matters.  A good reputation allows a state party to secure
future cooperation from other members of the treaty.159
According to Hathaway and Shapiro, “outcasting” measures encourage
states to comply with international legal obligations because of states’ desires
for future cooperation with each other.160  Outcasting encourages compli-
ance because of the prospect of future benefits that a state may lose should it
fail to abide by its own commitments.161  For example, an “external outcast-
ing regime requires member states to withdraw cooperative benefits from a
state that violates the law.  The withdrawal of cooperative benefits is meant to
create an incentive for the outcast state to change its behavior.”162
Given that the BHR treaty is still in a preliminary stage, it is worth
exploring the possibilities of making it self-enforcing through internal
reputational mechanisms.  Unfortunately, as currently drafted, the BHR draft
treaty does not possess the types of internal reputational mechanisms that
could encourage parties to comply with its terms.  This is because the com-
mitments that states make are not reciprocal obligations; the commitments
they render to others are not commitments they desire at some future point.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 116–17.
158 Id.
159 Brewster, supra note 133, at 242; Brummer, supra note 133, at 625 (explaining how
defection from treaty commitments could compromise the ability of a state actor to coop-
erate with others to advance its own national interest in the future); Guzman, supra note
133, at 1849.
160 Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 305.
161 Id. at 340–41.  Similarly, the literature on self-enforcing contracts explains that par-
ties keep their commitments when the value of future transactions outweighs the short-
term gain of opportunism; the prospect of future benefits is key to inducing cooperation.
See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, The Role of Incomplete Contracts in Self-Enforcing Relationships, 92
REVUE D’E´CONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 67, 71 (2000).
162 Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 320.
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This is even more true for the BHR treaty’s indirect audience: corporations.
Their cooperation with the treaty’s terms does not provide them with a repu-
tation that they can exchange for something of value vis-a`-vis the other mem-
bers of the treaty.163  A shorthand for the difference is that the BHR treaty
provides responsibilities but not rights to those performing those responsibil-
ities.  For example, the BHR treaty outlines a number of corporate responsi-
bilities for protecting human rights but the rights holders are the
beneficiaries of those responsibilities—third-party constituents harmed or
potentially harmed by transnational business conduct.  The treaty does not
create “rights” for corporate actors that can be used as a carrot to induce
cooperation.
The lack of carrots distinguishes the BHR treaty from its nonbinding
cousin, the United Nations Global Compact (GC), which does offer a num-
ber of benefits for its corporate participants.  Specifically, the “main positive
incentives provided by membership in the GC are reputational and financial.
Members of the GC can use its logo in advertising and especially smaller
businesses mention the networking opportunities offered as part of the GC
local networks as a positive.”164  Additionally, the GC also fosters peer learn-
ing and capacity building by members.165
Interestingly, one of the most important carrots that the GC offers to
members—reputational gains—may only be available because it is a nonbind-
ing and therefore voluntary institution: companies that join it are seen as
socially responsible because they are going “above and beyond” by abiding by
institutions that they are not legally bound to obey.  GC participants there-
fore enjoy a reputational bump by doing something that they were not obli-
gated to do.  A legally binding institution does not have the same
reputational effect if corporations are legally obligated to obey.  As a result, a
nonbinding institution primarily offers reputational gains for commitment
and compliance, whereas a legally binding institution offers reputational
losses for failures in commitment and compliance; the baseline differs
between the two.
The lack of rights in the BHR treaty is not surprising.  Many believe that
transnational corporations already enjoy significant rights in domestic politi-
cal arenas and on the world stage.166  International institutions like the BHR
163 See, e.g., Deva, supra note 109, at 24 (“The zero draft relies exclusively on sanctions
to ensure that business activities of a transnational character are consistent with human
rights norms.  While disincentives are critical, equally vital would be for state parties to
create economic incentives for responsible businesses, not merely in domestic public pro-
curement policies but also in all commercial dealings (e.g., contracts, loans, export cred-
its) of a transnational nature.”).
164 Wagaki Mwangi et al., Encouraging Greater Compliance: Local Networks and the United
Nations Global Compact, in THE PERSISTENT POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 131, at 203,
208.
165 Id.
166 See Deva, supra note 109, at 24 (“The zero draft of the treaty tries to address the
asymmetry between the rights and obligations of businesses by proposing to attach legal
consequences for human rights violations.”).
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treaty are intended to curb their power and not augment it.  These institu-
tions are also a response to a number of large-scale transnational harms cap-
turing public and policy attention.167  In this moment, most people are not
overly concerned with designing yet another institution that provides trans-
national corporations with additional rights.  While understandable, the
impulse to condemn and constrain has led to a lack of direct incentives for
cooperation offered by the BHR treaty; it does not have carrots to give.
One potential solution is to rely on “cross-countermeasures,” as
Hathaway and Shapiro recommend, to encourage compliance with human
rights treaties that offer public goods rather than private benefits.  Their key
insight is that the treaty at issue does not need to offer private benefits on its
own in order to encourage a state party to comply.  A state party is induced to
comply so long as there are future benefits offered by a treaty regime that are
placed at risk by noncompliance.  And “[w]here opportunities for cross-coun-
termeasures do not already exist, they can be created through careful institu-
tional design.”168
A few possibilities come to mind.  States can create benefits for corpora-
tions that comply with key provisions of the BHR treaty.  Here, we are talking
about two different types of states: home states and nonhome states.  Under
the BHR treaty, a member state takes on a number of legal commitments
regarding regulating corporations within its home jurisdictions according to
the terms of the BHR treaty.  But what if a corporation’s home state refuses
to join the treaty or abide by its own commitments?  For example, Acme Cor-
poration (Acme) has its headquarters within state A.  State A could incen-
tivize Acme to perform human rights due diligence in conformity with the
BHR treaty by implementing appropriate legislation and living up to its own
commitments under the treaty.  But what if state A refuses to do so?  One
possibility is that state B, as a third-party state, may offer Acme incentives that
state A does not; here, incentives may not take the form of direct sanctions
under the treaty but other types of benefits or inducements.  The problem
here is whether state B has the capability or willingness to offer private bene-
fits to Acme for compliance; this is a return to the state support problem
discussed in Section I.C.  Or state B could offer incentives to state A so that it,
in turn, can incentivize Acme to comply, but this, in turn, depends on state
B’s capacity and willingness to do so.  Hathaway and Shapiro note that the
power of outcasting depends on broad participation of states in international
legal institutions.169  These measures may not work at a moment in time
when states are questioning their participation in multilateral institutional
arrangements.
167 See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text.
168 Hathaway & Shapiro, supra note 16, at 321.
169 Id. at 340 (“[G]enerally speaking, outcasting is more powerful if there are more
participants in the outcasting regime.  A larger number of participants means that the
collective benefits are likely to be more significant and therefore the outcasting sanction
more powerful.”).
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If the incentive for compliance does not come from within the treaty,
then it must originate from outside it.  The following Part explains how exter-
nal reputational mechanisms (Type 4) encourage corporations to comply
with a treaty or other international institution.
IV. USING TREATY DESIGN TO IMPROVE REPUTATIONAL MARKETS:
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AS INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
A. External Reputational Mechanisms and Corporate Change
Even failed treaties have value.  This is good news because many treaties
confront a high risk of failure: They may fail to get adopted.  Even if adopted,
states may decline to ratify them.  And even ratified treaties confront an
enforcement problem when states ignore their legal obligations.  But treaties,
like other types of law, create downstream effects that may succeed where the
treaty does not.
This Section explains how the process of creating a treaty on business
and human rights may be beneficial even if the BHR treaty never emerges or
fails to achieve our objectives for it.  This is because its primary value is not in
its ability to regulate business and human rights but in the way it improves
reputational markets for business and human rights.  This Section considers
how legal institutions intervene in reputational markets by enabling corpo-
rate organizational change to “stand out” among similar disclosures by other
companies.  For example, a reputational crisis may incentivize transnational
corporations to engage in organizational change.  This organizational
change is a form of information disclosure that corporations use to reestab-
lish legitimacy in the eyes of their stakeholders.  To be effective in reestab-
lishing legitimacy, the disclosure must “stand out” meaningfully against the
backdrop of disclosures made by other corporations.  Otherwise, it will be
ignored or dismissed as cheap talk by stakeholders and will not have much
reputational rehabilitative value.
This is where treaties come in: a treaty—even a prospective one—can
transform a corporation’s organizational change into a credible informa-
tional signal.  This is because treaties can potentially create focal points
regarding our expectations for what constitutes good practices in certain pol-
icy areas, such as social compliance.  Specifically, they enjoy a number of the
hallmarks of third-party expression that scholars identify as important for cre-
ating focal points, such as publicity and uniqueness.170  First, even draft trea-
ties are heavily publicized because of the various government and
nongovernmental actors involved.  To date, there have been two draft texts
released for the BHR treaty, with commentaries provided by many business
and civil society actors.  Even critical commentaries are important because
resistance encourages publicity: By inviting resistance from the public (such
as prominent business associations or governments), a draft treaty gets atten-
tion.  The points of contention become high profile and the subject of policy
170 McAdams, supra note 17, at 1668.
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debates, both regarding the prospective treaty and independently.  This pub-
licity aids the draft treaty in standing out so that its norms can form a base-
line of expectations.
Second, as a prospective legal institution, treaties stand out from other
types of messages because these too “can speak more emphatically” than
other types of messages.171  This is because of unique features that legal insti-
tutions possess that other competing messages do not, such as (but not neces-
sarily) legitimacy or coercive capabilities.172  What matters is whatever makes
law different from other forms of expression so that messages from the for-
mer stand out from the latter.  Here, treaty making enjoys certain types of
processes that distinguish it from other types of private ordering.  The BHR
treaty process was initiated by the Human Rights Council of the United
Nations, thereby enjoying the publicity and status of a mandate provided by
the world’s most prominent international organization.  It occurs over a
longer time horizon and informs the agenda of many annual policy meet-
ings.  All these features help distinguish the baseline that the BHR treaty sets
from norms created independently through exclusive private ordering.
The creation of focal points helps to improve signaling within reputa-
tional markets for social compliance.  By establishing a baseline for consen-
sus regarding best practices in social compliance, the prospective treaty can
convert that baseline into a focal point.  By adhering to that baseline, a cor-
poration can credibly signal its organizational change and distinguish it from
its peers.  That baseline allows stakeholders to engage in firm-to-firm compar-
isons of the different changes that corporations adopt in response to a crisis.
Corporations that meet that baseline can credibly distinguish their behavior
from corporations that do not.  These changes are now visible to stakehold-
ers where they might not have been before and, as a result, corporations that
meet that baseline will receive great reputational rewards.  By calibrating
greater reputational rewards with greater investment in compliance, trea-
ties—even prospective ones—improve reputational markets for social
compliance.
The process begins with some type of triggering event for a transnational
corporation: a product accident, financial scandal, or media exposure of
unsocial practices (see Figure 1).  This event creates information effects con-
cerning the conduct of a corporate actor (Step 1).  Those information effects
are translated into reputational judgments by stakeholders of the corpora-
tion; when those reputational judgments are negative, the corporation sus-
tains reputational damage (Step 2).  The corporation will attempt to repair
its reputation, including through association with other organizations that
possess greater levels of perceived legitimacy than itself (Step 3).  The corpo-
ration will take steps to demonstrate its association with that organization,
including adopting and complying with institutions associated with that
organization (Step 4).
171 Id. at 1669.
172 See id. at 1670.
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FIGURE 1: COMPLIANCE AS A RESULT OF EXCHANGING
LEGITIMACY FOR INFLUENCE
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Step 1.  The dynamic begins with a triggering event (accident, scandal, or
other type of crisis) that releases information about the conduct of the corpo-
ration.  One of the most important information intermediaries is the media
that serves an important agenda-setting function: “The day-to-day selection
and display of news by journalists focuses the public’s attention and influ-
ences its perceptions.  The specific ability to influence the salience of both
topics and their images among the public has come to be called the agenda-
setting role of the news media.”173  The media’s coverage of a firm and its
activities contributes to the public agenda because “the prominence of ele-
ments in the news influences the prominence of those elements among the
public.”174
Step 2.  Information effects can result in a downgrade of an organiza-
tion’s reputation, resulting in reputational damage.  Revelations of poor reg-
ulatory compliance, financial misconduct, or other harmful practices can
compromise a business’s reputation in the eyes of the public.175  Reputa-
tional damage can lead to financial and nonfinancial consequences as vari-
173 Craig E. Carroll & Maxwell McCombs, Agenda-Setting Effects of Business News on the
Public’s Images and Opinions About Major Corporations, 6 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 36, 36
(2003).
174 Id. at 36–37; see Timothy G. Pollock & Violina P. Rindova, Media Legitimation Effects
in the Market for Initial Public Offerings, 46 ACAD. MGMT. J. 631, 632 (2003) (“Therefore, in
performing its functions of informing, highlighting, and framing, the media presents mar-
ket participants with information that affects impression formation and the legitimation of
firms.”).
175 See, e.g., Lucinda Shen, The 10 Biggest Business Scandals of 2017, FORTUNE (Dec. 31,
2017), https://fortune.com/2017/12/31/biggest-corporate-scandals-misconduct-2017-
pr/.  One study found that Wells Fargo could lose almost $100 billion in deposits and
another $4 billion in revenue over the next two years as a result of the scandal as consum-
ers switch to other banks. CG42, WELLS FARGO MINI-STUDY 3 (Oct. 2016), http://cg42
.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/cg42-Wells-Fargo-Mini-Study-102016vF.pdf.
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ous stakeholders reconsider their interactions with the affected business.176
These reputational effects can prime a transnational corporation for organi-
zational change by rendering it vulnerable to criticism.177  However, the
extent of vulnerability to criticism and change varies among corporations
depending on a number of factors
relating to company, product(ion) and home state characteristics: the risk of
being targeted by consumer boycotts which may vary with the location in the
supply chain, the visibility and prestige of a product, or the size of the com-
pany; the dependency on certain areas of operation, such as the location of
natural resources or the amount of sunk costs through previous investments;
and the risk of litigation or regulation by the home state.178
Another important factor affecting vulnerability is the desire for (a) social
membership in a particular group of actors,179 (b) improved social stand-
176 See Iacobucci, supra note 121, at 192–93. See generally Jonathan M. Karpoff, Does
Reputation Work to Discipline Corporate Misconduct?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPO-
RATE REPUTATION, supra note 18, at 363.  Companies often experience market sanctions
that exceed government penalties when the conduct concerns consumer fraud. See
Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear from Committing
Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON. 757, 758 (1993) (“[W]e present evidence that the reputa-
tional cost of corporate fraud is large and constitutes most of the cost incurred by firms
accused or convicted of fraud.”); see also Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to Firms of
Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008).  However, while the
market punishes firms for financial misconduct, evidence suggests that the market is not as
swift to condemn environmental transgressions.  Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Reputa-
tional Penalties for Environmental Violations: Empirical Evidence, 48 J.L. & ECON. 653, 671
(2005) (“Thus, unlike such other types of corporate wrongdoing as criminal fraud and
product safety problems, reputational concerns are not a sizeable deterrent to environ-
mental violations.  Rather, the primary deterrence occurs through regulatory and legal
penalties.”).  One explanation for the variance is that environmental violations, however,
“impose costs on parties other than those with whom the polluting firm does business.” Id.
at 656.  Exchange partners are not directly affected by the firm’s misconduct and are there-
fore less likely to sanction the firm. See id. at 656–57; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 18, at
1490 (“[M]arket forces will not induce firms to increase safety if those at risk are
strangers.”).
177 Risse & Sikkink, supra note 16, at 14 (“In the area of human rights, persuasion and
socialization often involve processes such as shaming and denunciations, not aimed at pro-
ducing changing minds with logic, but on changing minds by isolating or embarrassing the
target.”).
178 Deitelhoff & Wolf, supra note 131, at 228–29 (explaining that corporations are par-
ticularly vulnerable to consumer boycotts when they produce for end consumers and when
the underlying issues are understandable to the average consumer: “Their success depends
heavily on the possibility of translating complex problems into neat story lines that can
dramatically highlight responsibility and guilt.”); see id. at 230 (discussing the importance
of brand value for social vulnerability of corporations); Sikkink, supra note 16, at 823 (dis-
cussing the emotionally charged salience of issues concerning breast-milk substitutes and
infant deaths and the effect of that salience on corporate vulnerability and NGO
strategies).
179 See Risse & Ropp, supra note 132, at 20 (“Social vulnerability refers to a particular
actor’s desire to be an accepted member of a social group or a particular community.”);
Mwangi et al., supra note 164, at 211 (“Large firms not only have the resources to engage
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ing,180 and (c) the extent that stakeholders important to the corporation
care about the issues necessitating organizational change.181
Step 3.  Following a crisis, some corporations will engage in organiza-
tional change in order to repair its image.  Organizational change occurs
because of problems that corporations confront regarding legitimacy and
signaling.
After sustaining reputational damage, a corporation will seek reputa-
tional repair.182  To do so, it needs to counteract the information effects of
the crisis with information of its own that helps to manage or repair the
reputational damage associated with the crisis.  A reputational crisis can levy
many different costs on a corporation’s assets.  One such asset is legitimacy,
which refers to the “‘socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
definitions’ of what society considers ‘desirable, proper, or appropriate.’”183
Legitimacy is also an asset that a corporation, like any other organization,
needs in order to survive.184  When a corporation fails to “meet society’s
expectations, then it must act to re-establish its legitimacy to fend off social
sanctions.”185  One means of reestablishing legitimacy is through voluntary
information disclosure.  Therefore, we may expect that corporations will vol-
untarily disclose information in response to a reputational crisis.186
All this tells us is that we may expect increased information from a cor-
poration when it is in crisis.  But there are many ways for a corporation to
transmit favorable information about itself into society: press releases, press
in these types of activities, but also have more interest in proactively engaging these issues,
in particular in a transnational context where business success depends on dealing with a
variety of governmental and non-governmental actors.”).
180 See Risse & Ropp, supra note 132, at 21 (“States with insecure identities or those that
aspire to improve their standing in the international community may be more vulnerable
to pressures.”).
181 See id. (“[T]he application of social pressure works, because actors care about their
standing in a social group.  And the more the relevant community cares about human
rights, the more the target is vulnerable to external (and internal) pressures to comply
with these norms.”).
182 See Hess & Dunfee, supra note 24, at 8 (“If a firm fails to meet society’s expectations,
then it must act to re-establish its legitimacy to fend off social sanctions.”).
183 Id. (quoting Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995)).
184 See Deegan, supra note 24, at 293; DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 17, at 70; Meyer &
Rowan, supra note 17, at 340.
185 Hess & Dunfee, supra note 24, at 8.
186 See Sylvie Berthelot et al., Environmental Disclosure Research: Review and Synthesis, 22 J.
ACCT. LITERATURE 1, 18 (2003) (providing literature review on reasons for voluntary
mandatory disclosure and explaining that legitimacy theory predicts that the “socio-politi-
cal context drives differences in environmental disclosure across firms and over time”);
Craig Deegan et al., Firms’ Disclosure Reactions to Major Social Incidents: Australian Evidence, 24
ACCT. F. 101, 103–04 (2000) (summarizing research on how industries experiencing a
“legitimacy crisis” following a crisis increase corporate disclosures); Hess & Dunfee, supra
note 24, at 9–10 (“[T]he impetus behind many corporate disclosures may be a legitimacy-
threatening event, such as a crisis faced by the firm or the industry involving negative press
coverage, or revelations of poor environmental and social performance.”).
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conferences, philanthropic giving, and other forms of crisis management are
all key strategies for reestablishing legitimacy in the wake of a crisis.187  Why
would we expect a corporation to engage in institutional change rather than
opt for a lower-cost alternative?  The answer is signaling: a press release sig-
nals something different than a multistakeholder initiative.  This postcrisis
information problem is another variant of the “lemons problem” in which
sellers of high-quality products face challenges with credibly distinguishing
their own goods from low-quality products in the market; therefore, they
often enlist the aid of reputational intermediaries to help verify their infor-
mation to potential consumers.188
Corporate social disclosure following a crisis is also subject to informa-
tion asymmetries between the public and the corporation; the public does
not know whether the social information submitted by the corporation gives
an accurate representation of the corporation’s practices or is simply “green-
washing.”189  In other words, any corporation can engage in “cheap talk.”
This has two consequences: First, it reduces the likelihood that the public will
take postcrisis social information disclosure seriously.  Empirical studies sug-
gest that many individuals mistrust corporate communications, even prefer-
ring to receive corporate information from the news media.190  Second, as a
result of this mistrust, a corporation confronts difficulties in trying to reestab-
lish its legitimacy through disclosure of social information.191  These reasons
also explain why socially responsible corporations encounter difficulties in
distinguishing themselves in the marketplace from socially irresponsible cor-
porations and run the risk that the public will discount social disclosures
from all corporations.192
Given this problem of credibility, a corporation may want to rely on sig-
naling in order to help its information disclosure “stand out” among all the
187 See William L. Benoit, Image Repair Discourse and Crisis Communication, 23 PUB. REL.
REV. 177, 178 (1997); W. Timothy Coombs, An Analytic Framework for Crisis Situations: Better
Responses from a Better Understanding of the Situation, 10 J. PUB. REL. RES. 177, 182 (1998)
[hereinafter Coombs, An Analytic Framework for Crisis Situations]; W. Timothy Coombs, Pro-
tecting Organization Reputations During a Crisis: The Development and Application of Situational
Crisis Communication Theory, 10 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 163, 166 (2007) [hereinafter
Coombs, Protecting Organization Reputations].
188 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 676–77 (1984) (dis-
cussing information asymmetries in the securities markets); Clayton P. Gillette, Reputation
and Intermediaries in Electronic Commerce, 62 LA. L. REV. 1165, 1171 (2002) (“Potential credi-
tors might not trust information transmitted directly by debtors and rarely will have the
opportunity or expertise to evaluate even credible information.”); see also Brian Galle, Self-
Regulation of Social Enterprise, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW 26
(Benjamin Means & Joseph W. Yockey eds., 2018).
189 See Galle, supra note 188, at 32–33; Hess & Dunfee, supra note 24, at 17–20.
190 See Hess & Dunfee, supra note 24, at 17–20.
191 Id.
192 Id.
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other corporate disclosures.193  Here, a high-quality actor will want to take on
some form of costly activity that a low-quality actor cannot or will not
replicate.194
Organizational change is a form of costly postcrisis information disclo-
sure that allows a corporation to reestablish its own legitimacy.195  Legal insti-
tutions also help businesses signal the quality of their postcrisis
organizational change.  For example, article 5 of the BHR treaty establishes a
normative baseline for the types of organizational features that are needed
for a robust human rights due diligence program.196  By establishing that
baseline, the treaty allows stakeholders to evaluate different forms of post-
crisis organizational change by businesses and distinguish between those that
meet the baseline from those that do not.  This differentiation between busi-
nesses helps firms with robust social compliance programs stand out from
their peers, thereby increasing the odds that the reputational markets will
reward their investment in costly compliance programs.
Intermediaries, often associated with legal institutions, also help to sig-
nal costly organizational change.  In order to signal the quality of its post-
crisis information disclosure, a corporation may gravitate toward another
actor that can endorse or verify the information the corporation puts out
into the public.197  The actor that a corporation gravitates toward will need
to be an organization that the public will take seriously regarding the type of
information conveyed.  For example, companies selling securities often
obtain the services, or “endorsements,” of third-party intermediaries in order
to signal the quality of their disclosures to prospective purchasers and differ-
entiate their disclosures in the market.198  Reputational intermediaries “sig-
nal the value of disclosures to investors” by “lend[ing] their reputations to
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See SIMMONS, supra note 16, at 119–20 (explaining that “high ex ante costs send a
credible signal of intentions” and that states use treaty ratification processes to credibly
signal their commitment to a treaty).
196 See Revised Draft, supra note 13, art. 5.
197 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 188, at 675; Galle, supra note 188, at 6–9.
198 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 188, at 675–77; Gillette, supra note 188, at 1171
(explaining that potential creditors will “attribute high reputational quality to firms that
are willing to present the information to third parties (the rating agencies) that presuma-
bly have the expertise to evaluate debt and that have the capacity to transmit the informa-
tion to a broader population, some members of which will be able to evaluate quality”).
Trade associations, guilds, and other types of business associations can also serve as
intermediaries providing reputational information in situations of information asymmetry.
For example, Avner Greif explained that a merchant of the Maghribi coalition knew cer-
tain things about a member agent simply by virtue of the latter’s membership in the coali-
tion: (a) the agent had a good past record of transactions (or else he would have been
kicked out), and (b) the agent would enter a transaction with the knowledge that dishon-
esty would lead to his future ostracism from the coalition.  Avner Greif, Reputation and
Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857, 868
(1989).
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issuers that want additional credibility for their disclosures.”199  Reputational
intermediaries help one firm’s information stand out among other available
information in the marketplace.200
When we are talking about social information, a reputational intermedi-
ary is an organization that possesses a strong reputation in the social area at
issue (labor rights, gender issues, etc.).  Corporations will turn to these orga-
nizations in order to help signal the quality of their social information disclo-
sure.  They turn to these organizations because these actors can verify the
quality of that information in a manner that the relevant audience will find
credible.
Step 4.  During this final stage, a corporation adopts the institutions pro-
moted by the organization whose association it desires.  A corporation may
do so for several reasons.  First, an organization, such as an NGO, may refuse
to associate with a corporation unless the latter agrees to adopt the institu-
tions associated with that organization (such as a code of conduct) or to
cooperate with that organization in order to develop new institutions appro-
priate for that corporation.  Additionally, a disgraced corporation may bene-
fit educationally from adopting the institutions of the other organization
because of the latter’s expertise in a policy area.  Institutional transfer can
lead a disgraced corporation to adopt the attributes that provides its associ-
ated partner with public legitimacy by adopting the organizational attributes
that stakeholders admire and respect, thereby allowing it to establish its legit-
imacy independent of its association with another organization.201
For example, several years ago, Nestle´ entered into an agreement with
one of its own NGO critics after this NGO had orchestrated a consumer boy-
cott campaign against Nestle´ because of its marketing practices in the devel-
oping world for breast-milk substitutes.202  This campaign had drawn
significant international attention to the risks of the products and Nestle´’s
involvement, creating significant reputational risks to the latter’s image.203
On January 25, 1984, Nestle´ agreed to abide by a voluntary code of conduct
199 Peter B. Oh, Gatekeeping, 29 J. CORP. L. 735, 746 (2004); see Ronald J. Gilson, Value
Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 290 (1984) (“The
intermediary is paid only because its reputation renders it trustworthy in circumstances
when a party to the transaction could not be trusted.”); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 620 (1984) (describing
the role of an investment banker as a reputational intermediary who “represents to the
market (to whom it, and not the issuer, sells the security) that it has evaluated the issuer’s
product and good faith and that it is prepared to stake its reputation on the value of the
innovation”).
200 See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 199, at 619–20 (explaining how the reputation
of a seller can assure prospective buyers that the quality of the information it provides to
them ex ante is high).
201 Risse & Sikkink, supra note 16, at 12 (discussing instrumental adaptation of human
rights by state actors subject to NGO activism regarding human rights practices); see
DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 17, at 66–67.
202 Sikkink, supra note 16, at 815.
203 Id. at 826–30.
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developed three years previously by the World Health Organization (WHO)
regarding the marketing of breast-milk substitutes.204  In exchange, the NGO
called off a seven-year international consumer boycott of Nestle´ products.205
1. Illustrative Example: Disney, Shareholders, and “Project Kaleidoscope”
In the 1990s, a number of prominent brand companies came under
public scrutiny for “sweatshop practices” in their supply chains.206  The fol-
lowing discussion explains how media exposure of labor practices in supply
chains helped one group of Disney’s shareholders pressure Disney to change
its own practices (Figure 2).  The shareholders first acted through resolu-
tions to encourage Disney to change (Step 1).207  The reputational risk asso-
ciated with their activism and media coverage208 (Step 2) encouraged Disney
to participate in a multistakeholder initiative called “Project Kaleidoscope”
designed to improve compliance at factories that produced Disney goods in
China (Step 3).209  As a result of the project, Disney piloted a systems-level
compliance program at ten factories in China that produced its goods (Step
4).210
204 Id. at 815.
205 Id. at 835.
206 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
207 See infra notes 211–16 and accompanying text.
208 See, e.g., Michelle Faul, Low-Wage Labor Is Haiti’s Biggest Asset and Biggest Liability,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 16, 2017), https://www.apnews.com/142462030e4090c3616240bb
b32792d6; Walt Disney Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) 44 (Jan. 6, 2005)
(quoting a shareholder proposal from New York Retirement Systems on China labor stan-
dards, which posited that “human rights abuses in the overseas subsidiaries and suppliers
of U.S. corporations can lead to negative publicity, public protests and a loss of consumer
confidence, which can have a negative impact on shareholder value”).
209 PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE WORKING GRP., PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE: A COLLABORATIVE
AND DYNAMIC APPROACH TO CODE OF CONDUCT COMPLIANCE, FINAL REPORT 5 (2008) [here-
inafter PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE FINAL REPORT] (describing how shareholders interacted with
Disney’s board through proposed and withdrawn shareholder resolutions that resulted in
several rounds of meetings and, subsequently, a collaboration between the parties).
210 Id. at 2.
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FIGURE 2: COMPLIANCE AS A RESULT OF EXCHANGING
LEGITIMACY FOR INFLUENCE (DISNEY)
Step 1: Shareholders 
reference media 
exposure and submit 
resolutions for reform 
Step 2: Disney faces 
reputational risk from 
media exposure and 
shareholder activism
Step 3: Disney 
collaborates with 
shareholders in Project 
Kaleidoscope
Step 4: Disney adopts 
the standards, rules, and 
operating procedures 
developed in Project 
Kaleidoscope
In the 1990s, a group of Disney’s shareholders introduced shareholder
resolutions to address working conditions at Disney’s supply chains.211  The
General Board of Pension and Health Benefits of the United Methodist
Church (the “General Board”)  submitted one such resolution, stating that
the “public is concerned about the conditions under which clothing and
goods they purchase are produced” and the “media has made people aware
that more companies are contracting with independent producers for goods
and services outside of the United States.”212  The resolution requested that
the board of directors “report on its contract supplier standards, and review
compliance mechanisms for vendors, subcontractors and buying agents in
the countries where it sources” and that the review should include a
“[s]ummary of current company policies regarding supplier standards of
conduct” and the “[e]stablishment of procedures for internal compliance
and external monitoring,” among other topics.213
Disney’s board recommended that shareholders vote against this resolu-
tion.214  It is interesting to note, however, that the resolution did result in
Disney’s board providing greater information about its model of outsourcing
and the steps it had taken to address human rights compliance issues in its
supply chain.215  This was not an isolated shareholder resolution.  The Gen-
211 Walt Disney Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 9, 1997).
212 Id. at 27.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 28.
215 See id. at 29 (“During fiscal 1996, the Company took further steps to strengthen its
efforts in reviewing the performance of licensees and manufacturers and monitoring their
compliance with the Company’s standards.  As noted above, the Company has increased its
use of third-party investigators, both domestically and internationally.  In addition, the
Company has organized an International Labor Standards Group to review existing poli-
cies and practices and to consider means of strengthening their effectiveness, including
increased monitoring of compliance. . . .  In this connection, the Company has retained
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eral Board of the United Methodist Church, along with Domini Social Invest-
ments and other socially minded shareholders, brought a number of similar
resolutions against Disney in subsequent years to introduce meaningful insti-
tutional change.216
A few years later, these shareholders changed their tactics.  Beginning in
2002, they started to work with Disney (and one of its licensees, McDonald’s)
in a collaborative multistakeholder initiative called “Project Kaleido-
scope.”217  The project’s objective was to “to create a verifiable, replicable
model that results in sustained compliance in supplying factories.”218  In the
collaboration, Disney and one of its licensees, McDonald’s, partnered with a
number of faith-based shareholders that had pressured it to change in the
past through shareholder resolutions.  Other members of the collaboration
were organizations that had a “long history of engaging and working with
companies to address social compliance challenges in global supply
chains.”219  The makeup of this collaboration illustrates Step 4 of the frame-
work where a shamed organization associates itself with one or more organi-
zations more reputable than itself in the problem issue area (social
compliance).  Part of the explanation for why Disney turned toward these
organizations is that the latter can serve both the educational and endorse-
ment function: these organizations had experience and expertise with social
compliance and could help rebuild Disney’s reputation regarding social com-
pliance because of their own reputations in this area.
These organizations collaborated with Disney as part of a project in
which Disney agreed to organizational change in its supply chain.  Specifi-
cally, they agreed to work together on a pilot project involving ten factories
in China that produced toys, footwear, and apparel.220  The project’s
organizers sought to produce a systems-based approach that was inclusive by
“utilizing a multi-stakeholder approach whereby the factories (workers,
supervisors, management and owners) become more active participants in
the compliance process.”221  The project’s organizers sought “to transfer the
systems approach and methodology to other industries and geographic loca-
tions” once a system was producing verifiable consistent measurements.222
The program sought to ensure compliance by integrating policies into daily
operations, utilizing periodic assessments, identifying and correcting non-
compliance, establishing and communicating performance requirements,
Price Waterhouse LLP to assist the Group in its review.  The Group will report on the
results of its review to the Company’s senior management on an ongoing basis, and pro-
vide a forum for efforts to strengthen the Company’s performance.”).
216 See, e.g., Walt Disney Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 2,
1998); Walt Disney Co., Annual Report (Form DEF 14A) (Jan. 4, 1999).
217 PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE FINAL REPORT, supra note 209, at 1.
218 PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 27, at 3.
219 PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE FINAL REPORT, supra note 209, at 5.
220 See PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE INTERIM REPORT, supra note 27, at 1.
221 Id. at 3.
222 Id.
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and utilizing active training.223  By the end of the project, the factories
involved reported that the systems-based approach improved the following:
code-of-conduct compliance efforts, including identification of issues; moni-
toring and communications; manager-worker relations; working and living
conditions; and management capacities.224
If these organizations had simply loaned their names without anything
in exchange, then this story may be more vulnerable to public relations strat-
egy.  But the association was part of a project that involved institutional
design and change at a number of Disney’s factories, complete with monitor-
ing, auditing, and reporting procedures.  While certainly not perfect (or
over), these efforts illustrate how reputational risk can lead to associational
governance strategies that then lead to institutional change.
B. Legal Institutions as External Mechanisms
In the previous example, the process for institutional change began with
information effects associated with a crisis—media exposure of labor viola-
tions.  The crisis is important because it threatens a corporation’s reputation
and primes it to seek out a partner that can help it rebuild its reputation or
protect it from future risk.  It is the crisis and associated reputational threat
that provides the party with leverage over the corporation concerning institu-
tional change.
In the Disney example, the crisis was caused by a nonlegal triggering
event: media exposure of the labor practices of Disney and its peers.  But a
similar process of institutional change can also begin with a triggering event
associated with a legal institution that creates a reputational crisis for a corpo-
ration.225  We are familiar with the information effects of legal institutions
that have explicit disclosure functions.  However, our legal institutions also
offer a variety of informal information disclosure functions that are often
incidental to functions that these institutions are designed to serve.  For
example, news of a criminal conviction informs us of illegal conduct by indi-
viduals or organizations.  Even news of a government investigation or indict-
ment puts us on notice of harmful practices that could place us at risk.  Civil
lawsuits also inform us of particular misdeeds or patterns of misdeeds that
potentially jeopardize others besides the plaintiff.226  Legislative or adminis-
223 Id.
224 PROJECT KALEIDOSCOPE FINAL REPORT, supra note 209, at 31. But see CHINA LABOR
WATCH, CODE OF CONDUCT IS NO MORE THAN FALSE ADVERTISING, DISNEY SUPPLIERS CON-
TINUE EXPLOITING CHINESE WORKERS (2010); David Barboza, Despite Law, Job Conditions
Worsen in China, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/busi
ness/global/23labor.html.
225 Scott Baker & Albert H. Choi, Reputation and Litigation: Why Costly Legal Sanctions
Can Work Better than Reputational Sanctions, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 45, 47 (2018) (finding that
“litigation can be a catalyst for the imposition of reputational sanctions”).
226 See, e.g., Roy Shapira, Reputation Through Litigation: How the Legal System Shapes Behav-
ior by Producing Information, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (2016); Letter from Senator Pat-
rick Leahy et al., to John Stumpf, Chief Exec. Officer, Wells Fargo 1–2 (Sept. 23, 2016),
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL205.txt unknown Seq: 45  7-JAN-20 14:49
2019] improving  human  rights  compliance  in  supply  chains 771
trative action similarly create information effects, particularly by drawing
attention to a problem with the status quo.227
As in the Disney example, the media still plays an important role by shar-
ing the information that the legal institution releases.  Journalists’ verifica-
tion methods often privilege legal documents, increasing the likelihood that
a lawsuit, for example, may receive media attention.228  Together, legal insti-
tutions and the news media transmit information about individual or organi-
zational behavior.  The institutional change process then proceeds very
similarly to the one discussed in Part IV except that we are now dealing with
two types of institutions: the focal institution and the external institution.  The
focal institution provides the substantive rules that we want corporations to
uphold.  The external institution creates reputational effects for corporations
that make that compliance more likely.  The corporation is reacting to the
incentives each one creates.229  In other words, it occupies a common institu-
tional environment inhabited by both types of institutions and oscillates
between the two.  The oscillation occurs because the external institution cre-
ates reputational harm that drives the corporation toward the focal institu-
tion, which offers reputational rehabilitation.230
The remainder of the process works similarly to the one described
above: The external institution releases information effects about a corpora-
tion’s conduct (Step 1).  Stakeholders of the corporation convert these infor-
mation effects into reputational judgments of the corporation, potentially
creating reputational risk for the corporation (Step 2).  The corporation piv-
ots to an organization that possesses greater legitimacy than itself in the pol-
icy area in which it is shamed and associates with this organization to redeem
reputation or manage future reputational risk (Step 3).  This organization
participates in the association if the corporation adopts the institutional prac-
tices that the organization promotes (Step 4).
https://www.leahy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/9-23-16%20Wells%20Fargo%20Letter%20
re%20arbitration%20FINAL.pdf (“[T]he ability to force customers into secret arbitration
proceedings allowed Wells Fargo to continue its outrageous practices with impunity for far
too long.  Wells Fargo customers have attempted to sue Wells Fargo in open court over the
sham accounts, including a case filed more than three years ago. . . . If either of the law-
suits had been able to proceed in court, countless Wells Fargo customers might have been
saved from being charged their hard-earned dollars for unauthorized accounts.” (footnote
omitted)).
227 See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, Adverse Publicity by Administrative Agencies in the Internet Era,
2011 BYU L. REV. 1371, 1378 (“Agencies continue to issue publicity primarily to inform, to
warn, or to sanction.”).
228 See Roy Shapira, Law as Source: How the Legal System Facilitates Investigative Journalism,
37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 171–80 (2018).
229 NORTH, supra note 17, at 7, 81 (explaining that institutions create incentives for
behavior within a society and organizations emerge and adapt in response to those
incentives).
230 PFEFFER & SALANCIK, supra note 17, at 43.
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FIGURE 3: COMPLIANCE AS A RESULT OF EXCHANGING LEGITIMACY
FOR INFLUENCE (LEGAL INSTITUTIONS)
Step 1: External 
Institution Creates 
Information Effects 




Step 3: Non-State 
Actor Associates 
with IO to Repair 
Reputation
Step 4: Non-State 
Actor Adopts Focal 
Institution 
Associated with IO
1. Illustrative Example: Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Association
and the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
This subsection applies the framework from the previous discussion to
the recent reputational crisis experienced by the Fe´de´ration Internationale
de Football Association (FIFA).  Figure 4 and the discussion below explains
how reputational damage caused by a legal institution—domestic govern-
ment investigation—creates a need for reputational repair (Steps 1 and 2)
that leads business actors to associate with international organizations (Step
3) and adopt the nonbinding institutions of those organizations (Step 4).
This example does not involve a transnational corporation but an organiza-
tion that also responds to many of the incentives associated with business
corporations, so this example provides useful lessons for the operation of
external mechanisms.
FIGURE 4: COMPLIANCE AS A RESULT OF EXCHANGING
LEGITIMACY FOR INFLUENCE (FIFA)
Step 1: Government 
Investigation into 
FIFA 
Step 2: Investigation 
Creates Reputational 
Damage
Step 3: FIFA 
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Step 4: FIFA Adopts 
Institutions 
Developed by United 
Nations
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FIFA is the international governing body for organized soccer.  FIFA’s
global operations have raised significant concerns over human rights risks,
especially concerning its bidding and selection process for the men’s World
Cup that is criticized for bribery and inadequate attention to the human
rights records of prospective host countries.231  For example, in recent years,
FIFA was criticized for its decision to award the 2018 and 2022 World Cup
tournaments to Russia and Qatar respectively; these choices attracted contro-
versy because of the poor human rights records of these countries.232  Other
potential human rights abuses involve population displacement and land
acquisition for stadiums and other tournament space, labor abuses in con-
struction projects for soccer tournaments, the working conditions in supply
chains of licensees of FIFA (such as apparel, sporting goods, and electron-
ics), human trafficking in the hospitality and accommodation sectors, and
excessive force by security providers.233  And those are just the risks associ-
ated with the men’s World Cup; these and other human rights risks may also
arise concerning FIFA’s other tournaments and activities.234
Despite these risks and criticisms, FIFA lacked an explicit commitment
to human rights in its practices and policies.  However, in 2015, a number of
external mechanisms helped prime FIFA for change on the human rights
front.  The first external mechanisms were the government investigations
brought by U.S. and Swiss authorities.235
The investigation by U.S. authorities, the enforcement cooperation pro-
vided by foreign governments, and the combined fury of the world’s soccer
231 JOHN C. RUGGIE, “FOR THE GAME. FOR THE WORLD.”: FIFA AND HUMAN RIGHTS 21
(2016).
232 See Charles Maynes, Between Sochi and the World Cup, Putin Built Up a Resistance to
Western Criticism over Human Rights, PUB. RADIO INT’L (June 14, 2018), https://www.pri.org/
stories/2018-06-14/between-sochi-and-world-cup-putin-built-resistance-western-criticism-
over-human; Rod Nordland, Corruption Claims Cast Cloud on Qatar’s World Cup Bid, N.Y.
TIMES (June 9, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/world/middleeast/british-
seek-penalties-against-world-cup-bid-winner-qatar.html.  In June 2014, the London newspa-
per, the Sunday Times, claimed that it had voluminous documents indicating that
Mohamed bin Hammam paid a total of USD $ 5 million to football officials in exchange
for their support for the Qatar bid.  Jonathan Calvert & Heidi Blake, Plot to Buy the World
Cup, SUNDAY TIMES (June 1, 2014), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/plot-to-buy-the-
world-cup-lvxdg2v7l7w.  At the time of the vote, bin Hammam was a member of FIFA’s
executive committee, which, until 2011, decided which country would host the World Cup.
Id.  Bin Hammam was ultimately banned from FIFA and an internal investigation also led
to the suspension of several members of the executive committee.  Kurt Eichenwald, FIFA
Can Still Save Itself: Release the Garcia Report, NEWSWEEK (June 2, 2015), https://www.news
week.com/fifa-can-still-save-itself-release-garcia-report-338215.
233 RUGGIE, supra note 231, at 22–24.
234 Id. at 24.
235 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Execu-
tives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption (May 27, 2015), https://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-
conspiracy-and.
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fans created a crisis of legitimacy for FIFA.236  According to FIFA, it exper-
ienced “the worst crisis of its history” and suffered significant damage to its
reputation as a result.237  This legitimacy crisis fueled a financial crisis that
provided a second external reputational mechanism that primed FIFA for
change.  Corporate sponsors had shamed FIFA in the past for other corrup-
tion issues,238 but this time the sponsors backed up threats with financial
sanction.239  Coca-Cola, Adidas, McDonald’s, Visa, and Anheuser-Busch
Inbev wrote an open letter to the FIFA Executive Committee in December
2015 demanding significant cultural change to reflect values of
“[t]ransparency, accountability, respect for human rights, integrity, leader-
ship and gender equality.”240
It was against this backdrop that FIFA turned to the Guiding Principles.
As a nonbinding institution, the Guiding Principles cannot compel FIFA to
adopt or adhere to its norms.  But the legitimacy and financial crises of
2015–2016 helped to prime FIFA for change.  Specifically, the criminal inves-
tigations attracted media attention, creating reputational damage for FIFA.
Actions taken by some of these sponsors also created a second round of
reputational damage, such as the open letter issued in December 2015 by
sponsors and media reports of FIFA’s financial situation.  Finally, the deci-
sion to award the upcoming World Cups to Russia (2018) and Qatar (2022),
states with notable human rights abuses, exposed FIFA to public criticism
and brought attention to its human rights practices.
Therefore, it is not surprising that when FIFA is criticized for its prac-
tices, including its human rights practices, it should pivot toward the United
Nations advocate for global human rights to improve its practices and
redeem its image.  Following the DOJ’s May announcement of charges, FIFA
announced that it would “recognise the provisions of the UN Guiding Princi-
ples on Business and Human Rights and will make it compulsory for both
236 FE´DE´RATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASS’N, 2016 FIFA REFORM COMMITTEE
REPORT 1 (2015) (“FIFA is currently going through the worst crisis of its history.”), https://
img.fifa.com/image/upload/mzzxqw0dabgx8ljmhxwr.pdf.
237 Id.; Owen Gibson, Fifa’s Existence at Risk If Reforms Are Rejected, Warns Issa Hayatou,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2016/feb/25/fifa-
reforms-issa-hayatou.
238 Thomas Barrabi, FIFA Corruption Reform, Independent Oversight Committee Unlikely
Despite Sponsor Criticism, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 24, 2015), https://www.ibtimes.com/fifa-
corruption-reform-independent-oversight-committee-unlikely-despite-sponsor-2024030.
239 Fifa Suffers £67m Loss After Crisis Takes Its Toll on Governing Body, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/dec/02/fifa-67m-loss-crisis-govern
ing-body; Brian Homewood, FIFA Faces $108 Million Deficit for 2015—Finance Overseer,
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-fifa-finance/fifa-faces-
108-million-deficit-for-2015-finance-overseer-idUSKCN0VY2UK; Rebecca R. Ruiz, FIFA’s
Financial Disclosures Show That Scandal Has Affected Its Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/18/sports/soccer/fifas-financial-disclosures-
show-that-scandal-has-affected-its-bottom-line.html (reporting $62 million in legal fees).
240 Open Letter to the FIFA Executive Committee, COCA-COLA COMPANY (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.coca-colacompany.com/press-center/company-statements/open-letter-to-the-
fifa-executive-committee.
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contractual partners and those within the supply chain to comply with these
provisions.”241
Later that year, FIFA requested that John Ruggie, UN Special Represen-
tative for Business and Human Rights, advise it on how it could “embed
respect for human rights across its global operations.”242  FIFA made its
request to John Ruggie in December 2015—a time when its legitimacy and
financial crises were particularly acute.243  In the following years, FIFA took a
number of concrete steps to adopt the Guiding Principles.  In its February
2016 reform, it included a new statutory provision addressing human
rights.244  In April 2016, Ruggie issued his report providing recommenda-
tions to FIFA on how it can manage and address the human rights risks of its
operations.245  These recommendations were based on the Guiding Princi-
ples and included the suggestion that FIFA adopt an explicit human rights
policy.246  In May 2017, the FIFA Council adopted a new human rights policy
that incorporates many provisions of the Guiding Principles.247  Article 1 of
the policy reads: “FIFA is committed to respecting human rights in accor-
dance with the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
(UNGPs).”248  Under article 3, FIFA commits to performing human rights
due diligence in order to prevent “adverse human rights impacts” and to
address those impacts if they should occur, all in accordance with the Guid-
ing Principles.249  Additionally, under article 11, FIFA commits to providing
remedies and to evaluating potential mechanisms for providing remedies
according to the effectiveness criteria identified under the Guiding
Principles.250
241 Press Release, Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Ass’n, FIFA Executive Commit-
tee Sets Presidential Election for 26 February 2016 and Fully Supports Roadmap for
Reform (July 20, 2015), https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/news/fifa-executive-
committee-sets-presidential-election-for-26-february-20-2666448.
242 RUGGIE, supra note 231, at 4.
243 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Sixteen Additional FIFA Officials Indicted
for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/sixteen-additional-fifa-officials-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and-corruption.
244 FE´DE´RATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASS’N, FIFA STATUTES, art. 3, at 11 (2019)
(“FIFA is committed to respecting all internationally recognised human rights and shall
strive to promote the protection of these rights.”).
245 See generally RUGGIE, supra note 231.
246 Id. at 29.
247 FIFA Publishes Landmark Human Rights Policy, FIFA (June 8, 2017), https://www.fifa
.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/news/fifa-publishes-landmark-human-rights-policy-2893311.
248 FE´DE´RATION INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASS’N, FIFA’S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 5
(2017).
249 Id.
250 Id. at 9.
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C. External Reputational Mechanisms: Lessons for the BHR Treaty
1. BHR Treaty as a Focal Institution
One possibility is that an external legal institution—one unconnected to
the BHR treaty—nonetheless encourages compliance with it.  Here, an exter-
nal legal institution creates information effects with reputational conse-
quences for a transnational corporation; the corporation then gravitates
toward a more reputable organization that conditions its association with the
corporation on the latter’s conformity with provisions of the BHR treaty.  Or
the corporation may voluntarily comply with the BHR treaty provisions in
order to signal its steps toward organizational change (see Figure 5).  Either
way, the process works similarly to the example of FIFA in which a separate
legal institution creates incentives for compliance with the BHR treaty.
FIGURE 5: REPUTATIONAL EFFECTS OF CIVIL LAWSUITS ENCOURAGES







We can think of several possible legal institutions that may trigger this
process.  One is a civil lawsuit against one or more transnational corporations
that concern human rights practices in supply chains.  For example, in Octo-
ber 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a
dismissal of a case against Nestle´ and Cargill involving “claims they approved
the use of child slaves on Ivory Coast plantations and bribed slave masters to
get cheap cocoa.”251
Not only does this lawsuit shine an unfavorable light on Nestle´ and Car-
gill but it also keeps attention on conditions in the cocoa supply chains—an
issue repeatedly reported in the media—and Nestle´’s peer companies.252
These and similar legal institutions create information effects concerning the
human rights practices of transnational corporations and catalyze these cor-
porations to gravitate toward the BHR treaty norms.  Critically, corporations
may gravitate toward the BHR norms even if the relevant state actor does not
251 Helen Christophi, Ninth Circuit Revives Child Slave Labor Case Against Candy Makers,
COURTHOUSE NEWS (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/ninth-circuit-
revives-child-slave-labor-case-against-candy-makers/.
252 See, e.g., Brian O’Keefe, Bitter Sweets, FORTUNE, Mar. 1, 2016, at 55.
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incorporate those norms into domestic legislation.  Here, the treaty’s norms
are not directly binding on the corporation, but it complies with these norms
in order to signal a meaningful organizational response that can address its
reputational risk.  This signal potentially means more when the treaty norms
are not incorporated into domestic legislation because now the corporation
is doing something that it is not otherwise obligated to do; following the law
signals something different than voluntarily complying with norms an organi-
zation is not otherwise obligated to obey.  This signal also holds if the BHR
treaty does not even enter into force and remains a nonbinding set of norms.
Corporate compliance with these norms similarly signals that a corporation is
going beyond what it is required to do—a signal that may do more work for
reputational repair than adhering to legal obligations.
2. BHR Treaty as an External Institution
A second possibility is that the BHR treaty process does not lead to an
actual treaty but creates information effects of its own—effects that create
reputational risk and encourage corporations to gravitate toward another
institution.  Unlike in subsection III.C.1 of this Article, the BHR treaty pro-
cess functions as an external institution encouraging compliance with yet
another institution, such as the UN Guiding Principles.  After all, this treaty
process is also a legal institution that creates its own information effects.
FIGURE 6: REPUTATIONAL EFFECTS OF CIVIL LAWSUITS ENCOURAGES









We can expect at least three different types of information effects associ-
ated with such a treaty process: preemption, coordination, and noise.253 Pre-
emption effects occur when corporations engage in voluntary organizational
change or institutional development to illustrate why a treaty is not necessary;
this is the familiar self-regulation that occurs in the prelude to enhanced
regulation.254 Coordination effects occur when two or more corporations act
together in response to a treaty—either because they really like it or, more
253 Kishanthi Parella, Treaty Penumbras, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 275, 292–303 (2017).
254 See id. at 293; see also, e.g., Berthelot et al., supra note 186, at 17–18 (providing
literature review on theories suggesting that corporations voluntarily disclose information
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often, because they do not.255  But this resistance is productive because it can
draw public attention to the battle lines and the issues underlying those dis-
agreements.  Resistance can also grab attention and create pressure for
reform.  This is particularly true when organizations offer an alternative insti-
tutional arrangement as a substitute for the potential treaty.  Finally, noise
effects refer to the attention that a treaty process can attract.256
We can witness many of these dynamics in the reactions of the global
business associations to the BHR treaty process.  Potentially cognizant of
reputational damage, global business associations couched their concern
regarding the BHR Treaty with their commitment—and the commitment of
their millions of members—to voluntary regulation under the Guiding Prin-
ciples.257  In subsequent comments to the treaty process, industry associa-
tions such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and
International Organisation of Employers (IOE) reiterated that the “treaty
should strengthen the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Bus-
iness and Human Rights.”258  The comments emphasized that “[h]uman
rights are a high priority for the international business community” and that
“[e]ach of the[ ] representative organizations have endorsed the UN Guid-
ing Principles on Business and Human Rights and continue to be active in
promoting and disseminating the UN Guiding Principles and related imple-
mentation guidance among their membership and associated networks.”259
According to these actors, “[m]uch progress has been already achieved in the
following ecological accidents in order to prevent new regulations or actions by environ-
mental lobby groups).
255 See Parella, supra note 253, at 293.
256 See id.
257 See INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL., UN TREATY PROCESS ON BUSINESS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: RESPONSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY TO THE “ELEMENTS”
FOR A DRAFT LEGALLY BINDING INSTRUMENT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH RESPECT TO HUMAN RIGHTS 2 (2017) (“[O]ur opposition to the
‘elements’ paper does not diminish our commitment to helping to advance the business
and human rights agenda.  We continue to endorse, promote and disseminate the
UNGPs . . . among our members and networks.  We also actively help businesses of all sizes
to meet their responsibility to respect human rights in line with the UNGPs . . . .”); ICC
Disappointed by Ecuador Initiative Adoption, INT’L CHAMBER COM. (June 30, 2014), https://
iccwbo.org/media-wall/news-speeches/icc-disappointed-by-ecuador-initiative-adoption/.
258 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL., UN TREATY PROCESS ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS BY THE INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY ON A WAY
FORWARD 1 (2016), http://www.ioe-emp.org/fileadmin/ioe_documents/publications/Poli
cy%20Areas/business_and_human_rights/EN/_2016-09-29__IOE-ICC-BIAC-WBCSD_Pa
per_on_further_considerations_re_the_UN_TREATY_PROCESS_ON_BUSINESS_AND_
HUMAN_RIGHTS_final.pdf; Linda Kromjong, Intergovt. Working Group on Proposed Treaty
Needs to Have an Inclusive & Consultative Process, BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR., https://
www.business-humanrights.org/en/intergovt-working-group-on-proposed-treaty-needs-to-
have-an-inclusive-consultative-process# (last visited Dec. 2, 2019) (arguing that “[t]he UN
treaty process should strengthen the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles,” espe-
cially concerning the obligations of state actors).
259 INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ET AL., supra note 258, at 1.
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last five years with regards to the up-take of the UN Guiding Principle at the
political level and the company level . . . , and BIAC, ICC, IOE, and WBCSD
will continue to promote further up-take and implementation of the UN
Guiding Principles.”260
These statements have two independent effects: preemption and valida-
tion.  One interpretation of these statements is that business associations are
attempting to obviate the need for a new international (binding) institution
by demonstrating the effectiveness of an existing, nonbinding one (“there is
no regulatory problem that needs fixing”).261  A second interpretation is that
these same actors are legitimizing their role in business and human rights by
demonstrating how well they and their members have implemented the
Guiding Principles (“we are not the problem”).262  While these tactics facili-
tate resistance to the BHR treaty, they also push the treaty’s opponents even
closer to the UN Guiding Principles.
D. Reputational Mechanisms and Preventative Organizational Change
By improving reputational markets for social compliance, treaties not
only incentivize postcrisis organizational change but also preventative organiza-
tional change by corporations.  Both types of voluntary organizational
change depend on surmounting the signaling issue.  If the primary benefit of
compliance comes from reputational benefits, then those providing those
benefits must be able to distinguish between corporations that invest in low-
level versus high-level compliance.  If they cannot, then they will treat both
corporations similarly, with the result that the corporation that invests in
greater compliance will receive the same reputational benefits as the one that
does not.  Under these circumstances, the first corporation may face little
incentive to do more than the second if it will be treated the same in the
reputational markets.
Consider a hypothetical that explains this signaling problem.  Company
A produces a flashy brochure that lists its various core values and company
policies on its website.  Company B invests in a similar statement of values
and an accompanying set of company policies, but also publicly discloses
plans to integrate those policies into operating procedures, develops metrics
to track and evaluate effectiveness of those policies, and regularly communi-
cates with stakeholders concerning the evaluation and plans for improve-
ment.  Company B’s program is certainly more costly than the one used by
company A.  So, it is likely that company B will only invest in it if it receives
260 Id. at 6.
261 See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 38–40 (1992); John W.
Maxwell et al., Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environ-
mentalism, 43 J.L. & ECON. 583, 584 (2000).
262 Coordination through resistance can create reputational issues for business actors,
including their ostracism from further policy developments.  For example, some delega-
tions wanted the treaty process for the BHR treaty “to be protected from the commercial
and vested interests of the business sector.”  Report on the Fourth Session, supra note 103,
at 6; see also Parella, supra note 128, at 949 (discussing policy sanctions).
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payoffs greater than enjoyed by company A for its lower-level compliance
program.  If not, company B takes a net loss and will likely scale back its
investment in sustainability to align with company A; after all, if stakeholders
reward the two companies the same, why should company B do more?
The reason that stakeholders may treat the two companies the same is
because of the familiar signaling problem where “superior social performers”
appear similar enough to “inferior social performers” that both receive simi-
lar market benefits, making the former program more difficult to justify on a
cost basis.  Given comparable payoffs ex post, it may be difficult for a com-
pany, such as company B, to justify ex ante a compliance program more
costly than company A’s approach.263
This is where a treaty can help.  By establishing a focal point for best
practices in social compliance, a treaty helps company B’s investment in com-
pliance stand out from company A’s efforts.  This differentiation is similar to
the market separation discussed in Sections IV.A–C.  However, instead of dif-
ferentiating postcrisis organizational change, a treaty helps distinguish one
company’s ex ante compliance practices from another.  Treaties improve
reputational markets by allowing stakeholders to spot the difference between
the two.
In theory, once stakeholders can tell the difference, they will reward the
high compliance companies more than the low compliance ones.  The incen-
tive problem is addressed because greater investment in compliance leads to
greater reputational benefits and attendant competitive advantages for those
companies that do more.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS COMPLIANCE:
SPIRALS, TEXTURE, AND TORQUE
This Part examines implications of the reputational typology developed
in this Article.  Specifically, it addresses the risk of public relations, condi-
tions for successful organizational change, and implications for future inter-
national institutional change.
A. Spirals: Is It Compliance or Public Relations?
Perhaps the most obvious—and significant—challenge to the process
outlined in Parts III–IV is that it describes public relations and not compli-
ance: reputational shaming may lead to vague corporate pronouncements
for better behavior in the future and even vaguer corporate codes of con-
duct—codes that are rarely monitored for compliance or enforced.264  This
263 See Brian L. Connelly et al., Signaling Theory: A Review and Assessment, 37 J. MGMT. 39,
45 (2011) (“For signaling to take place, the signaler should benefit by some action from
the receiver that the receiver would not otherwise have done (i.e., signaling should have a
strategic effect); this usually involves selection of the signaler in favor of some
alternatives.”).
264 Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 680 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Plaintiffs allege
that,” despite supplier code of conduct, “Wal-Mart does not adequately monitor its suppli-
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Section offers three reasons for how we can manage the risk of public rela-
tions and encourage meaningful organizational change: institutionalization,
intermediaries, and information disclosure.
In managing the risk of public relations, we can borrow lessons from
reputational strategies designed to improve state compliance with human
rights.  After all, state behavior is also vulnerable to the same criticism: Is it
compliance or public relations?  One way of managing this risk is institutional-
ization, whereby state actors become increasingly enmeshed within overlap-
ping institutions that influence their behavior in a manner that is consistent
with human rights norms.
In the “spiral model,” processes of shaming state actors for their human
rights practices can lead to three separate socialization processes that
encourage state actors to internalize human rights norms and implement
these norms domestically: (a) instrumental adaptation and strategic bargain-
ing; (b) moral consciousness raising, argumentation, dialogue, and persua-
sion; and (c) institutionalization and habituation.265  In this first stage of
socialization, state actors may make some tactical concessions to international
NGOs and other actors in response to a transnational campaign for instru-
mental and not ideological reasons.266  Like organizational responses by busi-
ness actors, these types of state responses are also vulnerable to the same
criticism: Is it meaningful change or just public relations?
In the spiral model, the risk of public relations is addressed by explain-
ing how states, that initially respond with tactical concessions, change their
practices when international pressure engages them in the latter two stages
of socialization involving argumentation and institutionalization.267  The
power of argumentation is that state governments get trapped by their own
words—even words that they do not actually believe.268
These processes of argumentation and dialogue lead state governments
to take action that institutionalizes human rights norms, such as ratifying rel-
evant human rights treaties, incorporating human rights norms into domes-
tic legislation and constitutions, and creating access to remedies for
ers and that Wal-Mart knows its suppliers often violate the Standards.  Specifically, Plaintiffs
claim that in 2004, only eight percent of audits were unannounced, and that workers are
often coached on how to respond to auditors.”); Tim Bartley, Standards for Sweatshops: The
Power and Limits of the Club Approach to Voluntary Labor Standards, in VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS
107, 128 (Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash eds., 2009) (explaining audit evasion strate-
gies by managers of overseas factories); Richard M. Locke et al., Complements or Substitutes?
Private Codes, State Regulation and the Enforcement of Labour Standards in Global Supply Chains,
51 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 519, 526 (2012) (describing employment practices at overseas sites
that increase the risk of abuse).
265 Risse & Sikkink, supra note 16, at 5.
266 See id. at 12.
267 See id.
268 Id. at 16, 28; see also SIMMONS, supra note 16, at 14 (“Treaties constrain governments
because they help define the size of the expectations gap when governments fail to live up to
their provisions.”).
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violations of these norms.269  This institutionalization stage is critical because
it sets up processes and relationships that help ensure that states act in ways
that are consistent with their talk, irrespective of what members of state gov-
ernments may truly believe concerning the value of these human rights
norms.270
Similar socialization processes may also apply to business actors con-
fronting transnational campaigns regarding their human rights practices.
For corporations, institutionalization refers to the “accession to existing
human rights initiatives on the regional, global or sectoral level” and “the
adoption of company codes of conduct and the formation of specific CSR
departments and management structures within the company making
human rights become incorporated in the standard procedures.”271  It is true
that corporations may initially respond to reputational shaming with tactical
concessions intended to limit reputational damage and mollify critics; how-
ever, tactical concessions may be less effective for business actors because
these concessions “serve as new anchors for the transnational networks to
intensify their pressure.”272  And if NGOs and other actors can sustain pres-
sure on corporations, then the latter may join institutions (or develop new
ones) that ensure that corporations “walk the talk” regardless of the personal
beliefs of the managers, directors, or employees of those corporations.
Institutionalization decreases the risk of public relations; intermediaries
increase the odds of institutionalization.  Intermediaries include interna-
tional and local NGOs that remain actively engaged with a target actor—
whether state or business actor—even after initial tactical concessions.  These
intermediaries can help sustain pressure on corporations and increase the
odds that the latter will institutionalize their practices.  For example, follow-
ing media exposure and NGO campaigns, Nike responded in ways that insti-
tutionalized their new discourse on corporate responsibility by
“establish[ing] an extensive code of conduct, point[ing] to many examples
of improvement in its behavior, and establish[ing] a corporate responsibility
department in the late 1990s.”273  Nike was not alone as other large transna-
tional companies also responded to NGO exposure of human rights practices
by changing both internal policies and management structures.274
Intermediaries not only facilitate institutionalization but also ensure that
this institutionalization is effective in securing rule-consistent behavior by
269 Risse & Sikkink, supra note 16, at 29.
270 See id. (“We are not that interested in the ‘true beliefs’ of actors, as long as they are
consistent in their verbal utterances and their words and deeds ultimately match.”); see also
BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 17, at 554–56.
271 Deitelhoff & Wolf, supra note 131, at 236–37.
272 See id. at 230 (“In the case of Shell, such concessions even resulted in a number of
lawsuits and a call by the UN special rapporteur for Nigeria to investigate the activities of
Shell in the Niger Delta.”); see also Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Beyond Compliance: Rethink-
ing Why International Law Really Matters, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 127, 131 (2010) (describing the
role of precommitment).
273 Deitelhoff & Wolf, supra note 131, at 230.
274 See, e.g., id. at 231 (discussing the example of Shell).
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business actors.  When Nike and Shell faced NGO criticism in the 1990s, they
both responded with institutional changes, but “both companies remained
under public scrutiny and NGOs were eager to reveal any misbehavior that
would support the suspicion that the companies were only engaging in win-
dow dressing but did not significantly change their practices.”275
Business actors can also become important intermediaries in their own
right, establishing institutions that encourage other business actors to com-
mit to human rights norms and comply with those practices.276  Nicole Dei-
telhoff and Klaus Dieter Wolf refer to these practices as “norm-
entrepreneurship” by business actors whereby one or more companies not
only reform their own practices but champion similar reforms across the
broader industry.277  As such, companies can also play an important role in
institutionalization of human rights norms—institutionalization that can
reach other companies that may have been less vulnerable to NGO cam-
paigns and therefore less likely to change their practices but for the institu-
tional development of these companies.  Companies do not engage in norm
entrepreneurship for ideological reasons, necessarily, but because of compet-
itive concerns.  Namely, they may facilitate greater institutionalization of
human rights norms through norm entrepreneurship in order to level the
playing field among companies: “To reduce competitive losses, compliance
with human rights is more likely the more competitors comply as well.  This
amounts to strong incentives for the more vulnerable companies to engage
in norm-entrepreneurship.”278
Another factor that encourages institutionalization relates to the “lem-
ons problem” discussed in Section II.A: information disclosure.  Following a
reputational crisis, many corporations can engage in “cheap talk” with
promises to act better in the future.  The low cost of these statements and the
inability to verify their veracity leads consumers, NGOS, regulators, and other
public critics to downgrade the impact of these business responses to a
reputational crisis involving human rights.  The low cost of these statements
also crowds the space as many companies issue such statements because of
the low cost of duplication.
In order for a corporation’s message to “stand out,” it must be different;
this means that it must be more difficult for another company to replicate.
In other words, the message must be costly.  Institutionalization increases the
cost of messaging because corporations commit to actual policies and prac-
tices, thereby sorting the genuine CSR leaders from cheap talkers.  The
degree of sorting depends on the costliness of institutionalization.  Some
institutions ask more of corporations than others.  Joining an institution that
275 Id.
276 Id. at 234.
277 Id.
278 Id.; see also JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE DRAFT MODERN SLAVERY BILL, supra note 93,
¶ 172 (UK) (“We were repeatedly told legislation could serve to ‘level the playing field’
and raise the standards of companies that failed to tackle modern slavery in their supply
chains voluntarily.”).
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only asks for an annual report on progress is different—and less costly—than
one that involves an audit by a third-party organization and accompanying
suggestions for reform.
Institutions not only increase the cost of imitation, reducing the likeli-
hood of duplication, but they can also improve the verification of changes
claimed by a corporation.  For example, an institution may require that cor-
porations publicly disclose their human rights policies on an association’s
website or the company’s own site; similarly, an institution may also require
that companies publicly disclose their organizational structure and the
departmental units responsible for human rights policies and compliance.
These institutions decrease the risk of cheap talk by allowing the public to
verify the supposed changes in practices that business actors claim following
a crisis.
Intermediaries can also verify the changes that corporations make,
thereby allowing their changes to “stand out” and addressing the postcrisis
reputational problem.  They also play another important role in information
disclosure that relates to the external reputational mechanisms discussed in
Part IV.  Specifically, they raise the cost of association.  A corporation may
want to associate with an NGO in order to repair its reputation.  However,
the NGO may want the corporation to commit to certain institutions in order
to benefit from association with itself.  Here, it is the association with the
NGO—and not the institution—that helps a corporation’s postcrisis message
stand out and thereby repair its reputation; it is the association that it is the
costly signal and not the accompanying institution.  But the institution is the
price of the association and is another way that a corporation’s need for post-
crisis information disclosure leads to greater institutionalization of human
rights.
B. Texture: Under What Conditions Will Change Occur?
Texture refers to the conditions under which we might expect organiza-
tional change by business actors according to the processes discussed in Parts
III–IV.  It is called texture to illustrate that reputational mechanisms cannot
operate in a vacuum; instead, certain conditions need to be in place for these
processes to work—conditions concerning the value and vulnerability of a
business’s reputation, the reputation of its critics, nature of the crisis, infor-
mation asymmetries concerning the underlying issue, information
intermediaries, and information effects of the organizations in the business
actor’s environment.
First, the success of a reputational mechanism depends on the value of a
reputation to a corporation and its vulnerability to reputational damage.279
Some corporations derive most of their value from their brands; these com-
panies are among the most vulnerable to reputational shaming tactics
because consumers pay a premium for their good or service because of the
279 See Deitelhoff & Wolf, supra note 131, at 230 (discussing the importance of brand
value for social vulnerability of corporations).
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brand’s value.280  Information that tarnishes that brand creates a risk that
consumers may no longer be willing to pay that premium.  This risk becomes
even more acute when more and more corporations are forging a socially
responsible identity and engaging in social activism.281  On the one hand,
societal pressure may encourage corporations to adopt socially responsible
positions or practices (“talk the talk”); on the other hand, however, this rhet-
oric may make them more vulnerable to reputational damage if and when
their actions are exposed as inconsistent with their rhetoric.282
Second, it is not only the reputation of the corporation that matters.
Instead, the success of reputational mechanisms also depends on the
resources and reputations of the corporation’s critics, which are often NGOs.
Sikkink explains that one of the reasons that Nestle´’s NGO critic was able to
pressure Nestle´ to abide by provisions of the WHO/UNICEF code was
because “WHO[’s] and UNICEF’s reputations as technical agencies . . . cre-
ated greater receptivity for the body of scientific data that tended to support
regulation.”283  Additionally, “[w]hen the companies refused to change mar-
keting practices, organizations such as the American Public Health Associa-
tion, the Ambulatory Pediatrics Association, and the National Council for
International Health became endorsers of the WHO process and the Nestle´
boycott.”284
Third, the type of crisis influences the reputational sanctions we can
expect and the extent of reputational repair that a corporation will need to
address.  Two crisis factors are particularly important: emotional salience and
attribution potential.285  Some crises attract more attention than others and
the difference often relates to which actors are implicated and what issues are
involved.  The consumer boycott of Nestle´ products attracted attention
because it concerned the health of some of the most vulnerable populations
in the world.286  Other issues may not attract as much attention or backlash,
reducing the threat of reputational sanctions and the possibility of leverage
in exchange for reform.
Another factor is the possibility of blame attribution.  Crises can cause
more reputational damage when it appears that the corporation was aware of
the risk, could have prevented the harm, but chose to place its own interests
above the those of the parties who were subsequently harmed.287  In con-
trast, corporations may not suffer the same extent of reputational damage
280 See Varian, supra note 131.
281 See, e.g., Aaron K. Chatterji & Michael W. Toffel, The New CEO Activists: A Playbook for
Polarized Political Times, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2018, at 78; Tom C.W. Lin, Incorporating
Social Activism, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1535, 1578 (2018).
282 See Risse & Ropp, supra note 132, at 21.
283 Sikkink, supra note 16, at 832.
284 Id. at 824.
285 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 18, at 1444–45; Sikkink, supra note 16, at 823.
286 See Sikkink, supra note 16, at 823.
287 See Coombs, An Analytic Framework for Crisis Situations, supra note 187, at 182;
Coombs, Protecting Organization Reputations, supra note 187, at 168.
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when they can claim that it was an accident or that they were also a victim of
some third party’s conduct.288
Fourth, the success of organizational change through reputational sham-
ing also depends on the availability and quality of information.289  Some
issues are subject to the problem of information asymmetries: corporations
have all the relevant information and are able to hide their misdeeds from
the public.  The processes discussed in Part IV begin with reputational dam-
age that depends on the availability of information from either a legal institu-
tion, such as a court, or a nonlegal institution, such as the media.  When
there is no information, then there is no reputational sanction and, conse-
quently, no organizational change along the processes described above.
Some jurisdictions attempted to level the playing field by mandating cor-
porate information disclosure that is relevant to social practices, such as poli-
cies and procedures on human rights due diligence.  For example, California
requires that certain companies publish on their websites their internal poli-
cies for detecting and discouraging human trafficking in their supply
chains.290  However, even if this information is available, it is rarely meaning-
ful without the aid of information intermediaries who collect, compare, ana-
lyze, and report on these information disclosures.  After all, who is the
audience for this information?  It is likely an actor who possesses leverage to
change the incentive structure for a corporation so that the latter will change
its practices.  One obvious audience is the corporation’s consumer base.  But
it is doubtful whether consumers have the time, inclination, or expertise to
review these policies and reward companies with “good practices” and sanc-
tion companies with “bad practices.”291  It is more likely that they cannot tell
the difference between the two.
Enter the intermediaries.292  It is these actors who cultivate expertise in
the relevant policy areas so that they can meaningfully distinguish between
the practices of companies and recommend action to consumers.  Without
these intermediaries, the disclosed information may have limited salience
and impact on influencing consumer behavior and subsequent corporate
response.  As such, intermediaries are an important fifth condition because
they analyze information that is already publicly available—thereby making it
meaningful to consumers—or provide new information concerning condi-
tions in supply chains.293
288 See Coombs, Protecting Organization Reputations, supra note 187, at 168.
289 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 18, at 1445–48; see also Richman, supra note 18, at
337–38.
290 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 (West 2019).
291 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 18, at 1448.
292 Intermediaries not only improve the effect of reputational sanctions by increasing
access to information but also provide reputational sanctions of their own. See Mwangi et
al., supra note 164, at 209 (describing the capacity-building and sanctioning roles of local
networks in encouraging compliance with the Global Compact).
293 Kathryn Sikkink, A Typology of Relations Between Social Movements and International
Institutions, 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 301, 302 (2003).
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The information provided and analyzed by intermediaries is important
because it enables these stakeholders to bring their unique sources of lever-
age to bear on the corporation.  For example, consumers relied upon infor-
mation produced by other NGOs and nonprofits in lawsuits filed against
Purina, Nestle´, Mars, and Hershey.294  Similarly, investors relied upon infor-
mation from NGO and media sources in shareholder resolutions filed against
Disney in the 1990s demanding changes to working conditions in Nike’s sup-
ply chains.295
Another related issue concerns the status of collective knowledge on an
issue that enables a critic to say definitively and credibly that some practices
are desirable and others are not.  For example, Sikkink notes that one of the
reasons that the NGO campaign against Nestle´ worked to get the latter to
adopt the WHO/UNICEF code was that the “high level of consensual scien-
tific knowledge contributed to WHO/UNICEF action on the issue, swelling
the ranks of industry critics with medical and scientific groups.”296
Finally, even if these processes work for a time, what is to say that a cor-
poration will keep improving its practices or even keep up with its current
commitments?  Institutionalization certainly reduces the risk of the former,
as discussed above in Section V.A.  However, a broader information environ-
ment is also important for sustaining pressure on a corporation for continu-
ous improvement.297  A corporation’s actions are reactions to the
environment in which it is situated and may depend on its supply of reputa-
tional incentives offered by actors with whom it interacts.298  For example,
Acme Corporation could face (a) treaty on business and human rights, (b)
activist litigation concerning its mineral extraction practices abroad, (c) gov-
ernment investigation into the same, (d) mandatory disclosures regarding
the same, and so on (Figure 6).  Other members of the public may supple-
ment these incentives with their own actions.  Civil society organizations may
have reacted to the information and organized a consumer boycott of Acme.
Acme’s investors, alarmed by the consumer reactions and regulatory threat,
may add their own leverage for change.
294 See supra text accompanying note 48.
295 See supra notes 211–12 and accompanying text.
296 Sikkink, supra note 16, at 824.
297 See Risse & Sikkink, supra note 16, at 33.
298 Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 18, at 1454–55 (“[P]roduct liability litigation may
result in publicity about product problems and thereby enhance market forces and spur
regulation.”).
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FIGURE 7: EXTERNAL REPUTATIONAL MECHANISMS SUPPLIED










The addition of multiple actors contributes to a higher number of
reputational incentives that leads to more powerful incentives (increased pres-
sure), greater variety of incentives (different types of incentives produced by
different actors), and incentives that are offered over a longer time horizon.  In
this way, the reputational incentives produced by each actor interacts and
influences incentives created by another, producing a collective set of reputa-
tional incentives capable of cajoling a corporation toward better human
rights compliance.299  Collectively, these actors and their capabilities form
the texture that determines the success of reputational mechanisms for
encouraging organizational changes in corporations concerning their
human rights practices.
C. Torque: How Much Change Is Possible?
The processes outlined above describe organizational change by one tar-
get actor, such as a large TNC.  As acknowledged, various factors limit the
success of these efforts at reform through reputational mechanisms—particu-
larly brand vulnerability.  Not all TNCs are equally vulnerable to reputational
sanctioning.  Therefore, if the processes described above only work for a
small swath of businesses, then the best hope for reform is to consider the
ripple effects of organizational changes by that select group of businesses.
We can imagine that broad organizational change in an industry or a region
consist of two components: interfirm reform and intrafirm reform.  If reputa-
tional sanctions, as described above, only work for a handful of firms, then
the best hope for reform are the interfirm dynamics.  Think of the process as
a domino effect: the processes described in this Article explain what it may
take to get that first domino rolling, but broad level change depends on
299 See Sikkink, supra note 293, at 303.
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whether the other dominos in the set follow suit.  Whether those other domi-
nos will also follow depends on “torque.”
This Article defines “institutional torque” as the magnification and
globalization of institutional changes that, at first glance, appear very narrow
and local.300  Let’s consider a couple of hypotheticals for illustration.  Let’s
imagine that Acme, a brand company that sells luxury handbags, is targeted
by an international NGO that draws public attention to the poor labor prac-
tices in the overseas factories that manufacture Acme’s handbags.  This NGO
publishes regular reports documenting the labor abuses and secures sus-
tained media attention to the issues.  It also coordinates with other NGOs
(global and local) to orchestrate a consumer boycott against Acme.  Let’s
also imagine that this boycott has a negligible effect on Acme’s sales but does
draw unwanted attention to Acme and puts its brand value at risk at a time
when its managers are considering a merger with another company.301
Given the risk to its reputation, Acme concedes to the NGO’s demands and
enters into an agreement by which it agrees to a number of specific reforms.
At first glance, this institutional arrangement seems to concern a narrow set
of actors (Acme and its NGO critic) concerning a narrow set of reforms (out-
lined in the agreement) addressing a specific set of labor issues at a few sup-
plier sites in a limited number of countries.  However, as explained below,
this institutional arrangement may undergo three separate magnification
effects—cross-market, geographic, and industry—that extend its application to
new actors in new places.
Cross-market magnification effects occur because Acme is a transnational
corporation and sells goods other than handbags.  As per its agreement with
its NGO critic, Acme introduced a new human rights policy governing its
global operations and created a new human rights compliance department
identifying potential human rights impacts of its operations.  Finally, the
agreement stipulated that Acme would synchronize its human rights compli-
ance department with its department for procurement and supplier manage-
ment so that policies and guidelines developed by the former are integrated
into the actions of the latter, thereby decreasing the risk of future violations.
These institutional changes influence not only Acme’s operations concern-
300 For example, in another area of corporate compliance, corporate prosecutions not
only influence the behavior of the target firms but also the behavior of all the peer compa-
nies that are observing the prosecution.  Griffith, supra note 10, at 2090–91 (“Companies
track enforcement activity and heed the elements of compliance that enforcement authori-
ties have either applauded or found lacking in peer firms.  DPAs/NPAs thus have a strong
signaling effect on firms not party to the immediate settlement, pushing them to adopt
compliance mechanisms similar to those imposed upon their peers.  The result can be
thought of as ‘compliance creep,’ in which compliance features converge as a result of the
precedential effect of settlements and the widespread mimicry of peer firms.” (footnotes
omitted)).
301 Sikkink, supra note 16, at 826–27 (“Nestle´ eventually reached agreement with it[s]
critics not only because its sales were directly hurt but also because a new senior manage-
ment team wanted to turn its attention to more pressing business problems, in particular
mergers and acquisition in the U.S. market.”).
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ing its handbags but also all the other goods it sells.  This is cross-market
magnification whereby “naming and shaming” practices in one market intro-
duce norms in multimarkets because of the common denominator of the
target corporation.
This type of magnification effect also leads to another: geographic magni-
fication whereby human rights institutions developed in response to issues in
one location lead to the globalization of these norms because of the global
nature of the operations of the target corporate actor.
Finally, Acme’s institutional arrangements may undergo yet another
level of magnification (industry magnification) because of market competi-
tion.  As discussed above, corporations that are targeted by NGO campaigns
and subsequently engage in institutional reform may attempt to reduce com-
petitive losses from those reforms by becoming “norm entrepreneurs” and
attempting to bind competitors to those same practices.302  In our hypotheti-
cal, Acme, bound to institutional arrangements because of its agreement with
the NGO, may attempt to export those institutions to others by developing a
new industry code of conduct or other initiative that it champions.  This
move has low costs for Acme because it is already bound to abide by these
institutions because of its agreement; therefore, a new code of conduct that
tracks the agreement’s institutional arrangements offers limited new costs to
Acme.  It does, however, introduce new costs to its competitors so that Acme
and the former would compete on a level playing field.
Through torque dynamics, norms disseminate across different institu-
tions by different actors using a variety of institutions (Table 2).  The NGO
was the first agent of change which introduced norms through its agreement
with Acme; Acme came to the negotiating table because of the NGO’s “nam-
ing and shaming” tactics (mechanism).  In the second phase, Acme became
the agent of change by disseminating its practices throughout its global oper-
ations through its own policies.  Finally, in the third phase, Acme is an agent
of change concerning industry institutions that it attempts to change through
“norm entrepreneurship.”
TABLE 2: AGENTS AND MECHANISMS OF MAGNIFICATION EFFECTS
Magnification Effect Institution  Mechanism Agent 
Original Contract  “Naming and shaming” NGO 
Cross-market;  
Geographic Company policies 
Internal compliance  
programs ACME 
Industry  Industry codes Norm entrepreneurship ACME 
It is important to note that institutionalization resulting from this last
level of magnification occurs for different reasons than the initial institution-
alization process that introduced the norms in the first place.  Specifically, it
all began with the agreement between Acme and the NGO: it is this institu-
302 See supra Section V.A.
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tion that introduced the human rights practices.  This institution resulted
from Acme’s social vulnerability to NGO tactics that had to do with its prod-
ucts and profile, among other factors.303  But perhaps this same NGO could
not use similar tactics against Acme’s peers for several reasons: Acme’s peers
do not possess similar brand recognition; the NGO has limited resources; its
peers were not involved in similar crises recently, reducing the likelihood of
media coverage; and the human rights practices of its peers are not vulnera-
ble to the types of emotional salience of crises involving Acme.
For these and other reasons, Acme’s peers are not as vulnerable to the
same NGO; as a result, it is unlikely that this NGO could have committed
these peer companies to institutional reform using the same tactic it used
with Acme—getting the companies to sign an agreement.  But even if these
peer companies are not vulnerable to the NGO, they could be vulnerable to
Acme through associational affiliations, contractual arrangements, or other
relationships.  Acme then becomes the exporter of norms, not the NGO.304
The latter has already set the processes in motion by using its leverage over
Acme; Acme now uses its own leverage over its peers.  Through these
processes, what started as a set of institutional reforms for one industry and
one actor (Acme) could potentially reach multiple markets in multiple coun-
tries and bind multiple actors.  This is torque.
Torque can compensate for the limited vulnerability of many businesses
to the “naming and shaming” techniques described above. But torque reduces
our reliance on not only reputational mechanisms but also legal institutions.  For
example, we need to acknowledge the political moment in which we find
ourselves: rising nationalist sentiment and growing wariness of international
commitments hardly set the stage for yet another treaty, on human rights or
anything else.  In this day when the possibility of new multilateral treaty
regimes seems remote, we may be able to accomplish much with very little
through torque.  The advantage of torque is that it reduces our reliance on
one or more grand multilateral regimes that accomplishes it all.  Instead, we
can achieve similar effects through fragmented processes that rely on multi-
ple institutions and multiple actors.  Consider a second hypothetical: country
A introduces new legislation that imposes both civil and criminal penalties
on individual officers of foreign corporations that operate in the extractive
industries in country A.  Beta is a transnational corporation with headquar-
303 See generally Deitelhoff & Wolf, supra note 131, at 228–30; Sikkink, supra note 16, at
823.
304 See Veronica Root, Coordinating Compliance Incentives, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1003,
1016–17 (2017) (“[O]rganizations must often find mechanisms to adopt compliance
reforms in order to engage in certain business relationships with other private parties. . . .
This type of private pressure for the adoption of compliance programs is necessary because
companies are ‘increasingly accountable not only for their own compliance’ but also that
of their business partners, which motivates corporations to obtain contractual assurances
that business partners are engaged in acceptable compliance practices.” (quoting Scott
Killingsworth, The Privatization of Compliance, in TRANSFORMING COMPLIANCE 33, 33
(2014))); Jonathan C. Lipson, Promising Justice: Contract (as) Social Responsibility, 2019 WIS.
L. REV. (forthcoming).
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ters in Canada and operations around the world.  Its wholly owned subsidi-
ary, Beta X, is incorporated under the laws of country A and engages in
mining operations there.  Beta X’s management, alarmed by the new legisla-
tion, introduces new human rights policies and practices intended to address
the risk that its officers may be subject to liability.
However, given Beta’s organizational structure, Beta X’s new policies
and procedures do not only influence the behavior of the subsidiary’s
employees but also cycle back to the broader transnational corporation, Beta,
that incorporates some or all of the new policy changes throughout its
broader organization.  Beta—as a transnational corporation—then exports
those new policies and procedures to new locations besides country A
because of the global nature of its operations; these policies influence the
actions of Beta’s employees (and the employees of its subsidiaries) in country
B and country C and so on.  Beta may also export these policies in its contrac-
tual arrangements with its suppliers or other contractual partners.  Finally,
Beta may export these policies to its peer companies to reduce its competitive
losses.  For example, perhaps its global competitor, Theta, does not operate
in country A.  Therefore, Theta has no pressure to adopt costly new human
rights policies and procedures.  However, Beta may engage in “norm-entre-
preneurship” through the creation of new industry codes or initiatives that
encourage its peers to adopt similar human rights policies (and publicly
shame them if they do not).  In this manner, domestic legislation in one
country—that may be difficult to replicate at the international level or in a
different country—achieves de facto global effects without the need for an
international treaty arrangement; instead, similar effects are achieved by bor-
rowing the organizational structure of the target actors—corporations—that
already have a global footprint and using their own operations to disseminate
human rights norms.
CONCLUSION
While corporations respond to increased pressure for social responsibil-
ity, we regularly witness gaps between their rhetoric and conduct.  This is
especially true in the supply chains of transnational corporations.  Here, cor-
porations not only fail to “do good” but also introduce new harms of their
own.
Government actors and NGOs, among others, attempt to improve
human rights due diligence in the supply chain through domestic legislation,
consumer boycotts, shareholder resolutions, and media exposure.  The inter-
national treaty under development is the latest regulatory strategy attempting
to reform the supply chain.  However, there are reasons to doubt whether
powerful states will support it: Many countries—especially the home jurisdic-
tions of large transnational corporations—resisted development of the
treaty.305  Previous attempts to design mandatory  international institutions
305 See H.R.C. Res. 26/9, supra 94.
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addressing business and human rights failed.306  Global industry associations
have already issued objections to the text.307  Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, many of the grand international institutions that characterized
the post–World War II era are under suspicion or threat, creating significant
doubts about international cooperation regarding yet another new
institution.
This Article’s typology of reputational mechanisms offers regulators,
NGOs, and other actors insight on how to incorporate reputational incen-
tives into the draft treaty so that corporations may cooperate with its norms
even if states do not.  Specifically, better understanding of internal and exter-
nal reputational mechanisms helps these actors include important “carrots
and sticks” into the treaty’s design, as well as identify important enforcement
strategies that could encourage corporations toward better human rights
compliance in their supply chains.
306 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
307 See INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS ET AL., supra note 107.
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